Stop me before I fill up again!

It is a supreme irony that a wealthy Bedouin should be playing the role of a tough-love drug counselor to the world's oil-addicted consumers even as he continues to be the globe's biggest pusher. It was not the intention of Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah to take on such a role, but merely the bizarre consequence of his consent to plans by his oil minister to limit the country's oil production to no more than about 12 million barrels per day from 2009 onward.

It's a move that should have been on the front page of every newspaper and that should have led every news broadcast the day it was announced. The world's largest exporter, an exporter that every major oil-consuming nation had been counting on to boost production to at least 15 million barrels per day over time, had just told the world that it wasn't likely to get what it wanted. Since most of the public still has no inkling that we are approaching the peak in world oil production, the announcement came and went with little notice.

The U. S. Energy Information Agency still projects 16.4 million barrels per day of production for Saudi Arabia by 2030, though it had projected 23.8 million barrels per day in 2025 as recently as 2003. Expectations have come down to match reality, but perhaps not by quite enough.

The king's ostensible reason for the move was that he wanted to leave some oil in the ground for the benefit of future generations. It is a move long anticipated by resource economist Douglas Reynolds who told me in 2004 that government-controlled oil companies such as Saudi Aramco would increasingly see little point in generating oil revenues beyond their immediate needs for funding defense and social programs.

In Russia where production unexpectedly declined in the past year, the Putin government has been levying exorbitant taxes on oil extraction--in some cases in excess of 80 percent. The effect has been to slow extraction and save the oil for a later time. Whether the Putin government intended to do this, we cannot know for sure. But taxation is an easy way to accomplish such an objective where the government does not have direct control of all oil resources.

The practical effect of such policies by the world's two largest oil producers is to bring the peak in world oil production closer. But with supplies being held back for later development, the downslope on the production curve should be much more gradual than many expect, according to Reynolds. That suggests that our withdrawal symptoms may not be overwhelmingly severe as the oil economy wanes, possibly giving us a bit more time to adjust to a lower energy world and to find alternatives to oil. Once again the accidental drug counselors in Russia and Saudi Arabia are doing us a favor even if we don't appreciate it now. (If they were my parents, they would be telling me that I'll be thanking them for this when I get older.)

But the ranks of the accidental drug counselors don't end there. The lack of investment in Venezuela and Iran has limited production in both countries. This is true even though Venezuela is thought to have heavy oil deposits which rival the deposits of Canada's tar sands. Of course, it didn't help that the country's president, Hugo Chavez, essentially chased away private investment when he unilaterally altered contracts with major international oil companies. Beyond this, both countries have made spending on various social programs and subsidies a priority.

There is also the trouble in Mexico whose government-owned oil company, PEMEX, supplies about 37% of government revenues. The constant call on PEMEX's profits has led to severe underinvestment in oil production. And now, as production falls rapidly in Mexico's largest field, Cantarell, there is little other new production to replace that lost production.

The fear, of course, is that this lack of investment and self-imposed limitation on production will lead to a huge crisis in the not-too-distant future. I would contend that the crisis would come in time anyway and that our current path actually offers some hope that oil production will not collapse as we make our way through a very difficult energy transition. Such a path actually seems somewhat better than having cheap, plentiful supplies now that lull us into complacency for a while longer after which we might face a rapid decline in oil production. (Economists generally believe that this could not happen because prices would forecast shortages and adjust markets accordingly. For an explanation about why mineral markets do not forecast future supplies correctly, see my piece from 2004 entitled "Faith-based economics II: The case of oil's sudden scarcity.")

Also acting as a drag on current and future oil production is the lack of investment in the oil and gas infrastructure generally. Two years ago the International Energy Agency called for more than $20 trillion to be invested in the world's energy infrastructure through 2030 with about $3 trillion of that devoted to oil and gas infrastructure. Energy investment banker Matthew Simmons, who has been traveling the globe sounding the alarm about peak oil, recently produced a rather grim assessment of the state of the world's oil and gas infrastructure. He says the worst case scenario is a drop of 10 to 20 percent in oil production by 2013.

The geologic limits to oil production are now converging with economic and political constraints to bring energy stringency to the planet sooner than many had anticipated. No one, of course, knows for sure whether the scenario I suggest above is actually starting to play out. It's always possible that we could face steep production declines soon. But it's also possible that production could actually climb modestly or at least plateau after an initial drop as prices finally provide the needed incentive to invest in new capacity in those oil exporting nations that have been lagging in that investment to date. In addition, the oil that has been held back by such countries as Russia and Saudi Arabia would start to flow tending to keep production level for a time.

These latest developments should serve to remind us that we need to learn to set limits on ourselves if we expect to make it through the emerging energy transition. The fact that some inadvertent tough love from some unlikely characters is doing the job for us now strikes me as not being as bad as it seems.

What we don't know (A response to John Michael Greer)

John Michael Greer is as intelligent a voice on the issues of peak oil and sustainability as one can find. His recent piece entitled "Not The End of World" displays his broad reading in history and his deep understanding of culture. And, while history is an excellent source for understanding human nature and the natural world, it doesn't have the predictive power which he attributes to it.

In many ways history can tell us what to expect from people when they face circumstances similar to those observed in the past. But, it cannot tell us what to expect from events which are the result of far more decisions by people and far more changes in the natural world than any individual or even any group can observe or analyze.

First let me say that I too imagine that we will experience a stair-step decline in the functioning of global societies as our energy supplies recede. Greer is quite correct that historically humans have met resource declines with struggles to adapt, and that these efforts have changed the dynamics of the decline.

But I think he is too dismissive of those who worry about a rapid, steep decline. Greer takes the catastrophists to task because of their linear thinking: high prices and short supply today mean only ever higher prices and ever smaller supply of everything tomorrow and tomorrow in a straight line. The implication is that this will lead to the rapid destabilization of modern society. But, he is correct that historically, complex societies and their markets tend to take nonlinear courses. What he omits is that nonlinear systems can sometimes turn abruptly and steeply downward.

In truth, no one can know what the future holds because there are too many unknowns. We don't know how much oil is left? We don't know how much will be extracted and at what rate? We don't know when the peak in oil production will occur? And we don't know how severe the decline from the peak will be? We don't know how quickly alternatives will be found and deployed and whether they will give us anything near the energy that oil currently does? We have guesses, some optimistic, some pessimistic. But we don't have any certainty. (Of course, similar questions are being asked about natural gas, coal and uranium as well.)

I think the more important question to ask is this: What can we reasonably prepare for? A nearby oil peak followed by a swift and catastrophic decline in oil production might very well mean a quick end to industrial civilization. And, a very chaotic and nasty end it might be. But as a friend of mine recently asked, "How can you prepare for the end of civilization?" He didn't think anyone could. Our lives are too tightly intertwined. We will either overcome the energy and environmental challenges we face together or we will all go down together.

(I suppose one could become a survivalist and with expert knowledge of plants and animals live in the forest. But how many could actually do this? And, even if all us knew how, we would quickly deplete those forests and other sources of food as well.)

I think what we can reasonably prepare for is something that provides some semblance of continuity. We can prepare for a society that retains its basic functions: agriculture, mining, manufacturing, transport, and at least a modest technical base, especially the electrical grid. We can focus on those things which will be critical to our survival and let go of those things which we won't be able to save. (See my previous piece, "Triage for the Post-Peak Oil Age.")

While we cannot be sure what the future holds, I agree with Greer that we musn't be too hasty in assuming that we are now headed for the swift demise modern civilization. I'm not sure how we could prepare for it anyway. But it may be useful for each of us to dwell on the worst scenario for a bit as a picture of what might ultimately come to pass if we don't act decisively and resolutely now.

The just-in-time economy crumbles

Almost two years ago I wrote a piece called "Is just-in-time nearly out of time?" laying out how completely the just-in-time inventory management idea had infected businesses, governments and even nonprofit organizations. I catalogued concerns that the practice of holding razor-thin inventories of many critical items such as food, fuel and medical supplies could potentially imperil our ability to provide them in circumstances where 1) supplies grow unexpectedly tight, 2) logistical lines are impaired or cut, or 3) a large humanitarian catastrophe requires surge capacity for food aid and medical treatment.

Fast forward to 2008. Food riots are spreading across the world as soybean prices have more than doubled, corn and wheat prices have tripled, and rice prices have risen to more than five times their low of $4 in 2003. As a result of two decades of low agricultural prices, many governments became complacent and paid scant attention to food issues. They drew down grain stockpiles, neglected agricultural research and rural assistance, and generally took the attitude that market forces should increasingly dictate food production and prices. Food was becoming just another input into the world industrial system.

All that has changed as swiftly as grain prices have risen. India, which has always maintained a government stockpile of wheat, purchased several million tons in the international markets last year after six years with no imports. Malaysia announced a plan to "develop stockpiles of essential foodstuffs like rice and cooking oil." Guatemala announced plans to address food prices that include increasing food stockpiles within the country. Several countries announced bans or restrictions on rice and wheat exports.

Farm inputs, especially fertilizer, are also suffering from low inventories. The New York Times quotes one fertilizer dealer as follows: "If you want 10,000 tons, they'll sell you 5,000 today, maybe 3,000," said W. Scott Tinsman Jr., a fertilizer dealer in Davenport, Iowa. "The rubber band is stretched really far."

As much attention as food is rightly getting, other key commodities are becoming increasingly scarce for the usual reasons: strong demand from India and China and years of underinvestment in supply. Copper inventories at major exchange warehouses have dropped to just two days of global consumption. In China, coal supplies have dwindled to just 12 days, a very thin margin for power plants and other industrial users. So strained are supplies of steel that the Indian government banned steel exports recently. And, then it banned cement exports.

The realization that just-in-time methods have ceased to serve us well comes at a time when it is exceedingly difficult and expensive to build a stockpile of anything. Moreover, if every market participant decides to build a stockpile at once under tight supply conditions--as is apparently happening in the rice market--this only creates parabolic spikes in prices which encourage further hoarding.

To alleviate food shortages, several solutions are on offer. It's important, however, to see what is motivating those behind the so-called solutions. This libertarian writer complains that the market is not being allowed to work. Libertarians in general believe that government intervention is bad because it often produces perverse results and because it reduces the scope of action for the individual. When the state is involved in setting agricultural policy by, for instance, subsidizing basic grains and the production of biofuels and encouraging meat and dairy production (which require enormous amounts of grain for feed), this can have profound effects on the availability of food.

Certainly, government policy can distort food production. And, it is just such policies in North America and Europe that many advocates for farmers in poor countries decry as making it impossible for such farmers to compete. Cheap grain imports into poor countries destroy the market for grain grown locally devastating the livelihood of local farmers and leaving these countries vulnerable to shortages and price increases. But these advocates should be careful what they wish for. Do they really want to expose small, non-mechanized farmers in poor countries to all the vagaries of the world market with absolutely no protections for farmers in poor and rich countries alike?

France's agriculture minister thinks he has a better idea. Other regions in the world should create self-sufficient blocs like the European Union to administer something similar to Europe's Common Agricultural Policy. EU agricultural programs protect farmers by guaranteeing minimum prices, imposing import tariffs on certain foods, and providing direct payments for farming the land. France, as one might guess, is a significant beneficiary of such protections.

The free market advocates are in retreat for now as the European and North American models, however flawed, demonstrate that they can achieve one very important objective: excess supply of affordable food, in other words, a cushion designed to prevent shortages. It is only the interlinking of European and North American markets with the world markets that is pushing up domestic prices and draining food reserves. Of course, without those excess supplies being available for export, poor countries would be in much worse shape than they are.

But, the long-term damage to agriculture in poor countries that results from those models is a product of International Monetary Fund policy. That policy forced many poor countries to open their agricultural markets to the subsidized produce of Europe and North America in exchange for financial and development assistance. Things might not be so bad right now if these poor countries had been allowed to protect their farmers and insure adequate domestic production of basic foodstuffs as we in Europe and North America do.

In other areas such as minerals and energy, there are no alternatives in the short run except to use both of them more parsimoniously and look for suitable substitutes over time. (Ironically, many of the currently touted energy substitutes depend on the very fossil fuels they seek to replace.) Any fix will not come quickly or easily since it can take years to find and bring into production new mines and oil and gas fields. And, the lead time for building a renewable energy economy to replace the fossil fuel economy--which will recede as oil, gas and coal peak in production and then decline--is decades.

Of course, the question of where we go from here is not as simple as many experts and policymakers (who are often shilling for their corporate paymasters) suggest. First, we have to focus on immediate challenges such as food shortages, a huge task in itself. Then, we will have to focus on longer-term challenges with the urgency that such issues as peak oil now clearly deserve.

When I wrote "Is just-in-time nearly out of time?", I pondered whether just-in-time inventory management was an idea for all time or merely suited to a unique moment in history. I think we can answer now with confidence that it is the latter. It is clear that the just-in-time inventory model is increasingly responsible for much of the personal hardship and economic disruption we are now witnessing and that it ought to be discarded as an organizing principle as we build new systems for a sustainable future.

More coins in the fuse box

Even as the signs of a growing oil crisis gather around us, there are those who prefer to put coins in the fuse box. I am referring, of course, to the very dangerous practice of putting a coin in a fuse box where the fuse ought to go.

Sometimes foolish homeowners whose electrical systems are prone to burn out fuses do this out of frustration or as a temporary expedient until they can get to the hardware store. In doing so, they deny themselves the feedback that keeps electrical fires from starting. (I have used this analogy previously and couldn't resist trotting it out again given recent developments.)

Perhaps the most visible current coin-in-the-fuse-box proposal is John McCain's gas tax holiday. Its irresistible political appeal in a campaign year means it is likely to be enacted. By lowering gasoline prices his proposal would, of course, send a price signal to people to use more gasoline. That's hardly the message they ought to be receiving when the peak in world oil production is growing ever closer. McCain and many others have also called on the U. S. government to cease its oil purchases for the country's Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The move would eliminate one sizeable source of demand from the oil market. (Never mind that such a reserve might be especially important now when a major oil supply disruption could cripple the weakened U. S. economy.)

The result of suspending gas taxes and oil purchases for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve would probably be a brief period of lower prices followed by another runup set off by increased demand. So, instead of the money going into the federal highway trust fund, it would then go into the coffers of oil producers. (Perhaps the failure to repair roads and bridges would reduce incentives to drive more. But that hardly seems like an efficient and proper way to encourage less driving.)

Coins in the fuse box make for an addictive habit. As long as things continue along smoothly, the temporary fix feels great. That's why it is almost certain that as the date for resuming collection of the gas tax approaches, there will be a call to extend the tax holiday. And, if gasoline prices don't decline sufficiently by the time that extension lapses, there could be further calls to extend it.

In other important areas we are also being deprived of necessary feedback. The recent bailout of Wall Street investment banker Bear Stearns by the U. S. Federal Reserve tells Wall Street once again that the Fed will always come to the rescue if things get bad enough. Such actions create what in financial circles is called "moral hazard." It is the hazard that financial institutions will engage in ever more risky behavior to seek higher returns, secure in the knowledge that the government will rescue the financial system if it becomes vulnerable to systemic collapse.

This is not a new development, but one that has been growing in proportion for many years as I explained in a previous piece entitled, "When Socialists Take Wall Street." The fact is that as such bailouts become more certain over time, they become more necessary to avoid catastrophic financial collapse. That's because risk taking expands with each cycle of crisis and government rescue. As a result of decades of indulgent U. S. policy toward financial institutions, such risk taking has now expanded to the point where it would have been too risky for the Federal Reserve not to bail out Bear Stearns. Removing the coin from the financial fuse box--that is, letting Bear Stearns go down--would not simply have cut power to Wall Street; it might have made the entire world economy go dark.

But perhaps the most insidious of the current coins in the fuse box is the one that is in the mind of most Americans and perhaps many others across the globe. It is the idea that the high oil prices of the last few years are simply a cyclical phenomenon and that lower prices are sure to follow as the market brings forth new supply. While the market is indeed bringing forth new supply, the question now is whether that supply can keep up with depletion. The evidence increasingly is that it will not and that high prices will become a permanent state of affairs.

The public is aided and abetted in this belief by the soothing pronouncements of the great majority of economists that the operations of the market eventually cure all high prices. It is a message that the public wants to hear and wants to believe is true. And, while it has turned out to be true on many occasions, neoclassical economics is not physics. There are exceptions to its precepts and this exception, if that's what it turns out to be, could be highly destabilizing to our global society.

Waiting for the market to resolve the oil problem on its own may have financial consequences just as severe as regulators feared would have occurred had Bear Stearns gone bankrupt. Imagine for a moment what $200- or $300-a-barrel oil might do to the economy. (In saying this, I am not advocating government actions that would lower prices. Rather I support deep subsidies for a rapid transition to renewable energy funded perhaps by higher taxes on nonrenewable energy.)

Because they are in power for a limited time, it is the habit of politicians and policymakers to temporize. They are simply trying to make it through to the next election. I do not expect any of them to take the coins out of the fuse box. If we want that to happen, we are going to have to do it ourselves, community by community.

Can the natural gas economy become a reality?

My latest column on Scitizen entitled "Can the natural gas economy become a reality?" has now been posted. Here is the teaser:

Natural gas has often been prophesied as the fuel of the future, one that will fill the gap when oil declines and give us the time we need to transition to a renewable energy economy. But can the assumptions behind this characterization stand up to scrutiny?....Read more

Disaster in progress: North America's home heating transition

With natural gas prices creeping higher on a daily basis, some homeowners dependent on natural gas for heat are starting to look for cheaper alternatives. In my area the outdoor wood burning furnace which is designed to supplement existing home heating has become a major source of friction among suburban residents.

The main complaint is the smoke produced by these furnaces as they heat water that is then pumped to the owner's house where a heat exchanger disperses the heat. A loophole in U. S. Environmental Protection Agency rules has left such furnaces unregulated though many municipalities and states are now seeking to ban them or at least regulate them. Part of the problem is that some furnace owners don't just burn wood; sometimes they burn household trash. Emissions from these furnaces have been measured by one government agency and the results are rather startling:

A 2006 report from the Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management, a nonprofit association of Northeast air quality agencies, found that average particulate emissions from one outdoor wood boiler equaled that of 22 wood stoves, 205 oil furnaces or as many as 8,000 natural gas furnaces.

The last wood heating craze occurred in the 1970s and abated when energy prices plunged and stayed mired in a 20-year bear market. But this time natural gas may be heading for a permanent decline in North America, and many homeowners throughout the United States and Canada will be scrambling for a more affordable source of home heat.

In rural areas, wood heat may become more widespread. But in heavily urbanized areas, coal may be the fuel of choice. It remains cheap relative to natural gas, and it is abundant. Moreover, some of the same manufacturers who make outdoor wood burning furnaces also make versions that will burn coal. Even indoor coal-burners are already available for homeowners. Finally, there are indoor and outdoor grain-burning furnaces.

The move to alternative sources of heat will put pressure on the remaining forests in North America as demand for wood and wood products for burning increases. This transition will also threaten the climate and air quality as coal-burning expands, and it has the potential to push grain prices even higher as homeowners compete for increasingly scarce grain to feed grain-burning furnaces. Electricity may also become a source of heat via portable electric space heaters, especially in the case of an acute crisis, and their use could potentially threaten the electrical grid.

There is, of course, solar space and water heating, and some people who have the resources will choose these options. But these options are not necessarily optimal for retrofitting in much of North America, and they can be costly to install (but not to run).

Neither heating oil nor kerosene will likely turn out to be good alternatives. Oil prices seem almost certain to remain high as we approach the all-time peak in world oil production. Propane, butane and liquefied petroleum gas (generally a combination of the first two) are simply products of natural gas wells and so will face the same depletion problems and price pressures as natural gas.

The alternative to this unfolding disaster would be an aggressive, subsidized energy efficiency retrofitting program for North American homes and a campaign to get people to use less natural gas by changing their behavior. But neither the Canadian nor the U. S. government seems even vaguely aware of the approaching crisis.

When an acute crisis arrives in the form of a very cold winter or a persistent decline in natural gas production, the result will inevitably be serious demand destruction. Many more homeowners will gravitate away from natural gas because of price uncertainties. Perhaps not so obvious is that whole industries dependent on natural gas for process heat or as a chemical feedstock will be forced to shut down and, where possible, may move operations closer to sources of cheap natural gas overseas, possibly to the Middle East or even to Russia where supplies remain abundant. (In fact, this has already happened for much of the nitrogen fertilizer industry and for parts of the chemical industry.)

The damage to the economy and the environment will be immense. And, the tragedy of it all will be that it could have been avoided or at least greatly mitigated by a sensible conservation program.

Manufactured foodscape

For many in North America food has become essentially a manufactured item, carefully packaged in colorful plastic and cardboard wrappers. The packages list the ingredients in small type as if they were elements from the periodic table rearranged by some present-day equivalent of the Star Trek replicator.

Few consumers realize the remarkable chemistry that does, in fact, take place in the farm field and in the ocean that transforms carbon from the air into the myriad compounds we recognize as food. And, except in those rare North American households where it remains an economic necessity, cooking itself has become something of the domain of wannabe gourmets with Martha Stewart fetishes.

The food manufacturing process has created effortless meals that often require nothing more than a little boiling or heating in the microwave to make them palatable. The cost is in nutrition and overall health, costs which often don't show up for decades when they are detected in the physician's office or on the operating table--usually without any recognition of the link. But even the immediate economic costs of food seem virtually hidden from the public which in the United States pays less than 10 percent of its income for food both inside and outside the home. Only recently have rises in food prices began to appear on the radar of the average food buyer in America; still, don't look for any food riots soon.

Not so with the rest of the world. According to The New York Times Indonesians spend half their income on food, Vietnamese spend 65 percent and Nigerians spend 73 percent. A doubling of grain prices in the last three years is not something that can easily be shrugged off by families living in these and so many other countries. Unrest related to food prices has already been seen in Haiti, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Egypt, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Mozambique and Senegal.

There are the usual suspects: demand for meat in places with huge and growing middle class populations such as India and China, drought in Australia (one of the four remaining major grain exporters in the world), and demand for biofuels made from food crops. But it is the pricey manufactured foodscape invented by wealthy countries that has helped to create what is fast becoming a food crisis in the rest of the world. It is the industrial mentality itself which regards food as if it were just another input into the industrial system. One obvious result is that we treat food and fuel now as if they were simply interchangeable. Another is that we have streamlined agricultural and food processes by employing the same just-in-time manufacturing principles used to make steel or plastics. The result has been a reduction of world cereal stocks that are expected to fall to 25-year lows this year. As of the end of 2007 we have a 75-day supply of grain and that is expected to fall to around 69 days by the end of this year.

Michael Boskin, chairman of the first President Bush's Council of Economic Advisers, is reputed to have said, "It doesn't make any difference whether a country makes potato chips or computer chips." At the time he was pilloried for having suggested such a thing when it was accepted wisdom that a high-tech economy was the desired goal. But Boskin may actually have been wrong for reasons of basic food security. A country held hostage to the food exports of another may find itself without needed food just at the time when supplies are shortest. Witness the the banning of rice exports from Vietnam, Thailand, the Phillipines, Egypt and now India as rice prices have rocketed to new highs. In Argentina the government has attempted to keep domestic soybean and sunflower seed prices down by enacting huge new export tariffs that would effectively curtail exports of the crops. Farmers reacted by bringing the country to a halt.

Cereals are obviously not interchangeable with computer chips. Some 80 percent of all our calories come directly and indirectly (primarily in the form of meat and dairy products) from grain. People prefer to eat first and compute later, but only if there is time and money left over. No government or people seems to believe that strictly market forces ought to govern the price of staples. And, no one is actually willing to say in public that if you can outbid me for basic foodstuffs, then I have no right to complain even if it means my family and I starve.

It has been a truism from the beginning of civilization that cities require stocks of grain, surpluses that can last a year or even two to sustain them through drought or war. In the last two decades, the champions of the globalized trade system have turned that truism on its head and foolishly convinced governments and their leaders that food production and storage can be largely left to the marketplace.

All that is changing rather quickly. Governments are now temporizing as they try to address brewing revolts in the streets. At the World Bank there is talk of trying to raise yields over the long term. But that hardly matters to governments with hungry populations on their hands now. And the long-term yield raisers are assuming a growing supply of petrochemicals which are integral to our current farm productivity. Such a plan is called into question even by the most optimistic forecasts for oil supplies.

What then of the manufactured foodscape that has become such an important feature of North American life? It will likely succumb to the realities of food and the limits of the biosphere. There will be less manufacturing and more home preparation as the manufactured foodscape becomes too expensive to maintain. The limits we face in arable lands, in fossil fuels, and in the ability of the atmosphere to absorb greenhouse gasses will compel more people to grow and harvest some of the food they eat. These limits will compel us to eat less meat for no other reason than it will become prohibitively wasteful to feed valuable grain to livestock instead of eating it.

We will be forced to listen to the landscape once again and follow its dictates on how to raise food. And, we will be obliged to abandon much of the giant industrial food system that provides a freakish cartoon-like foodscape made up of "fun" foods, fast foods and frozen meals designed to cater to our most childish cornucopian fantasies.