Sunday, November 16, 2014

Did Russia and China just sign a death warrant for U.S. LNG exports?

Russia and China have signed two large natural gas deals in the last six months as Russia turns its attention eastward in reaction to sanctions and souring relations with Europe, currently Russia's largest energy export market.

But the move has implications beyond Europe. In the department of everything is connected, U.S. natural gas producers may be seeing their dream of substantial liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports suffer fatal injury because of Russian exports to the Chinese market, a market that was expected to be the largest and most profitable for LNG exporters. Petroleum geologist and consultant Art Berman--who has been consistently skeptical of the viability of U.S. LNG exports--communicated in an email that Russian supply will force the price of LNG delivered to Asia down to between $10 and $11, too low for American LNG exports to be profitable.

Now, let's back up a little. U.S. natural gas producers have been trying to sell the story of an American energy renaissance based on growing domestically produced gas supplies from deep shale deposits--now being exploited through a new form of hydraulic fracturing called high-volume slick-water hydraulic fracturing.

The problem has been that overproduction and low prices--now only a fraction of the $13 per thousand cubic feet (mcf) at the peak in 2008--have undermined the financial stability of the natural gas drillers. Here's why: Natural gas from shale, referred to as shale gas, is generally more expensive to produce than conventional natural gas and will require that natural gas prices go much higher than they are today--from around $4 per mcf almost certainly to over $6 per mcf and perhaps more to pay the costs of bringing that gas out profitably.

But at that price, U.S. LNG is no longer competitive in Europe. And now, because of the Russian-Chinese natural gas pipeline deals, it may no longer be competitive in Asia. Those are the two largest markets for LNG. Without them it is doubtful that the United States will be exporting much LNG--except perhaps at a loss.

Here's the problem: To convert U.S. natural gas to liquefied natural gas, put it on specially built tankers and ship it to Europe or Asia will cost about $6 per mcf. If the price of U.S. natural gas averages around $6 per mcf, the total landed cost of U.S. LNG will be the cost of the gas plus the cost of converting it and shipping it, that is, around $12 per mcf.

The most recent landed prices for LNG to Asia as reported by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission were $10.10 per MMBtu* for China, $10.50 for Korea and $10.50 for Japan. For Europe the numbers are even more sobering: $9.15 for Spain, $6.60 for the United Kingdom, and $6.78 for Belgium. All amounts are U.S. dollars.

These are probably reflective of spot prices rather than long-term contracts, and they are down due to softening energy demand that may be the result of an economic slowdown in Asia and Europe.

But, they give an indication of how difficult it will be for U.S. LNG to compete on the world market. LNG prices may well improve, but buyers of LNG typically sign cost-plus contracts. In the United States that would be the cost of Henry Hub natural gas (traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange) plus the cost of liquefaction and transportation. With no assurances--and a good deal of evidence to the contrary--that Henry Hub gas will remain at current prices (around $4) for the long term, it's difficult to see how there will be many long-term buyers of U.S. LNG.

One wonders under such circumstances just how many of the 14 proposed U.S. LNG export terminals will actually be built.

Having taken the long way around, let me return to the Russian-Chinese natural gas pipelines and their significance in this drama. Gazprom, the Russian natural gas giant that will actually deliver the gas, valued the earlier deal in May at around $10.19 per MMBtu. The latest deal has no announced value, but one analyst believes the Chinese will be asking for around $8 per MMBtu. Even if the Chinese end up accepting a price closer to the previous deal, some 17 percent of the Chinese natural gas supply will be coming from Russia when the pipelines are complete several years from now. And that will likely anchor the price of Chinese LNG imports between $10 and $11 per MMBtu, making the price too low to be reliably profitable for U.S. LNG exporters.

The implication is that today's soft prices for imported LNG to China and the rest of Asia may become the norm in a few years just as America's LNG export terminals are about to become operational. If investors fund these terminals and the Russian-Chinese pipelines get built, there is likely to be some epic capital destruction on the American side of the Pacific.

There are other reasons to be skeptical about America's future as a natural gas exporter. The rosy predictions of the industry and the U.S. Department of Energy for domestic natural gas production from shale may be overblown according to a new report from the same analyst who foresaw the massive downgrade of recoverable oil from California's Monterey Shale. Despite rising domestic natural gas production, the United States remains a net importer of natural gas. Natural gas imports accounted for about 10 percent of U.S. consumption through August of this year.

(Full disclosure: I worked as a paid consultant to help publicize the report mentioned above. But, as longtime readers know, since 2008 I've been skeptical about the wild claims of a long-term U.S. bonanza in oil and natural gas due to shale deposits. This report offers the first comprehensive analysis based on industry data and is produced independent of industry influence or money. Anyone with a stake in the industry or in U.S. energy policy should read it.)

It's possible that some U.S. LNG export projects may move forward in any case. If the buyers for this LNG sign long-term, cost-plus contracts as described above, those buyers will be in for a big surprise when U.S. natural gas prices rise. And those exports will create something of a self-reinforcing feedback loop by raising overall demand which will hoist domestic prices even higher for U.S. natural gas--even more so if there is not as much U.S. production as is currently being projected. If U.S. natural gas production remains at or below the level of domestic consumption, the United States could be faced with the rather bizarre prospect of having to import high-priced LNG from some countries to fill the gap created by LNG export shipments committed to others.

Higher U.S. natural gas prices will be a double-edged sword for those concerned about a cleaner energy future. U.S. natural gas producers and renewable energy companies will simultaneously rejoice if exports raise prices appreciably--producers because their financial fortunes will turn more positive and renewable energy companies because renewable energy will become more competitive with higher priced natural gas. Environmentalists, however, will gasp in horror as profitability rises enough in the shale gas fields to justify ever greater encroachments on the American landscape.

And, U.S. politicians who favor LNG exports may ultimately find themselves pilloried by consumers who must pay those higher prices and environmentalists who abhor the environmental costs--even as those politicians watch the campaign contributions flood in from a grateful shale gas industry.

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*MMbtu stands for 1 million British thermal units, a measure of heat content. Mcf, of course, means 1,000 cubic feet. This much natural gas contains almost 1 million Btus--975,610 to be precise. And so, the two measurements are often used interchangeably when comparing price though they are not precisely equivalent.

UPDATED: November 17, 2014 to include information on U.S. natural gas imports.

Kurt Cobb is an author, speaker, and columnist focusing on energy and the environment. He is a regular contributor to the Energy Voices section of The Christian Science Monitor and author of the peak-oil-themed novel Prelude. In addition, he has written columns for the Paris-based science news site Scitizen, and his work has been featured on Energy Bulletin (now Resilience.org), The Oil Drum, OilPrice.com, Econ Matters, Peak Oil Review, 321energy, Common Dreams, Le Monde Diplomatique and many other sites. He maintains a blog called Resource Insights and can be contacted at kurtcobb2001@yahoo.com.

Sunday, November 09, 2014

Why GMO labeling in the U.S. needs to win only once

There were no doubt celebrations last week in the boardrooms of corporations that own patents to the world's genetically engineered crops. Proposals to label foods containing these crops--commonly called GMOs for genetically modified organisms--were defeated soundly in Colorado and barely in Oregon.

That makes for a perfect record in the United States for the GMO purveyors who have beaten back every attempt to mandate labeling of foods containing GMO ingredients. But, I think the celebrations may be premature. For the advocates of labeling have vowed to fight on. They came within a hair's breadth of reaching their goal in Oregon. Who is to say that another round of voter education might not put them over the top?

And, that is the danger for the GMO patent holders. If just one state requires labeling, the food companies will have to make a choice: Special handling and labels for one state or one label for the entire country that also meets that state's standards.* If the first state to implement a GMO labeling requirement is populous, say, California or New York, the decision will be made for the food companies. It won't be sensible to segregate supplies for that state. And, even a less populous state might tip the balance. Some states have passed GMO labeling laws that require enough other states to pass such laws to reach a minimum population threshold of in one case 20 million before the law goes into effect.

Vermont has passed a labeling law that would not require other states to act. But the law is being challenged by the GMO industry in court. If it survives that challenge--which is not at all certain--then its implementation could end up being the one win which the labeling advocates need to create a cascade of labeling requirements elsewhere and the acquiescence of much of the food industry. On the other hand, even if Vermont ultimately prevails in court, the suit could result in lengthy delays in the implementation of the law and mean that the first genuine implementation of GMO food labeling takes place elsewhere.

What complicates matters further for the GMO seed companies is that an increasing number of food processors are opting to exclude GMO ingredients from their products. Many processors proudly display this choice by using the emblem of the Non-GMO Project on their foods (meaning that their GMO-free formulation has actually been verified).

Many others will find ways to eliminate GMO ingredients, especially if they represent a small proportion of the total for any product, just to avoid mandatory labeling.

All this means that as the momentum for labeling continues to build, the opponents of labeling will have fewer and fewer allies. And, if just one state adopts labeling, those allies will shrink appreciably as more and more food processors abandon the GMO bandwagon just to avoid the labeling requirement.

The other problem for the GMO purveyors is that the anti-GMO forces win even when they lose. With each ballot initiative the public gets a months-long education in the debate over the safety, utility and environmental consequences of GMO crops. The public is given broad information about what crops are genetically modified and which foods contain them. In the process, the GMO seed producers must take the position that they don't want the public to know which foods contain GMO ingredients. It's ultimately a losing position. An alert consumer will simply ask, "Why don't they want me to know?" And, that leads to all sorts of suspicions, both justified and unjustified.

Now, when Intel sells its chipsets to computer manufacturers, it wants the consumer to know that there's "Intel Inside." It's a big selling point! Godiva wants you to know all about how it makes its chocolate and where it comes from. But GMO seed companies--so proud of their technology on their websites--don't want you to know a thing about that technology when it makes its way onto your grocery store shelves.

One seed company executive summarized the reason perfectly all the way back in 1994: "If you put a label on genetically engineered food, you might as well put a skull and crossbones on it." The obvious question is: "What does he know that we don't?"

Here is the bind that the GMO seed companies are in. They went to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and filed patents that said each of their seeds is unique and therefore deserving of patent protection. The patent office agreed. Then, the companies marched over to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and said that their seeds don't need any special approval because the seeds are "substantially equivalent" to their non-GMO counterparts.

So, if these seeds are "substantially equivalent," then how can they be patented? The answer has to be that they are not equivalent, but unique. FDA scientists balked at the equivalence idea when they first reviewed requests from the companies for a waiver on testing. The scientists recommended that GMO foods be tested for safety just as new drugs are. After all, how can you actually know if something is substantially equivalent until you actually test it? In the end, however, politics overrode science.

Well-meaning biologists tell us not to worry about GMO crops. We've been altering the genes of plants for millennia. That's true, but never in this way and never at this scale. And, that's where the true risk lies. As I've explained before, the hidden risk in GMO crops is not one individual version. It is the repeated and continuing attempts to alter the genes of crops using genes from alien species without knowing the full risks. (You can't discover all of those risks even if you test because of complex interactions with the environment and human physiology that cannot be fully identified or, even if they could be, cannot be reproduced in the laboratory.)

And, we are not moving slowly with GMO crops as a way of testing whether there might be problems. Instead, we are introducing these new seeds at breakneck speeds over vast portions of the Earth. There is the risk, however small, that some seeds will wreck havoc on the Earth's biosphere and/or produce a massive worldwide crop failure and/or damage human health among a broad population. And, the risk of crop failures is multiplied further because most modern agriculture is based on risky monoculture farming.

The apologist might say that such GMO-related risks are very small. But, that apologist cannot say that they are zero. That means we face systemic ruin if something goes wrong. And because GMO crops have the ability to create systemic ruin, the probability that that ruin will occur approaches 100 percent as more and more GMO seed varieties are introduced into the environment and the resulting foodstuffs become part of the human diet.

The argument that we have no evidence that this could happen is, first of all, false: We already have superweeds as a result of excessive use of glyphosate, the herbicide used in conjunction with soybean crops genetically engineered to resist the herbicide. Research has shown that people with Brazil nut allergies can have allergic reactions to products into which Brazil nut genes have been introduced. (The offending GMO version of soy was never marketed.) But even if there were no direct evidence, the above argument is beside the point. That's because hidden systemic risks** don't show up until you are already ruined! They can only be prevented by refraining from doing those things which pose systemic risk, a type of risk we can recognize ahead of time if we ask the right questions.

The only question now is WHEN systemic ruin caused by GMO crops will occur. Next month, next year, 100 years from now? We cannot know. But, the benefits of GMO crops cannot be weighed against their costs, if one of the costs is complete ruin. There are no benefits which justify continually risking complete catastrophe. None.

We may do something systemically risky once and get away with it. But, we cannot get away with it forever. While labeling GMO foods won't solve that problem, it will be one more step in the march toward awareness of the potentially catastrophic risks we are taking with GMO crops.
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UPDATED: November 10, 2014

*Incidentally, that should be the response to the industry's claim that labeling will send prices higher in the state with the labeling requirement. Simple fix: Just use the same label for the entire United States!

**Purely local risks can often be evaluated and are susceptible to risk management approaches. But there is no risk management solution possible for hidden systemic risks for the very reason that they are hidden. Even where local risks are hidden, we can decide to tolerate them precisely because they are local and will not bring down worldwide systems, either natural or man-made.

Kurt Cobb is an author, speaker, and columnist focusing on energy and the environment. He is a regular contributor to the Energy Voices section of The Christian Science Monitor and author of the peak-oil-themed novel Prelude. In addition, he has written columns for the Paris-based science news site Scitizen, and his work has been featured on Energy Bulletin (now Resilience.org), The Oil Drum, OilPrice.com, Econ Matters, Peak Oil Review, 321energy, Common Dreams, Le Monde Diplomatique and many other sites. He maintains a blog called Resource Insights and can be contacted at kurtcobb2001@yahoo.com.

Sunday, November 02, 2014

Is there really an oil glut?

Back in March 1999 "The Economist" magazine carried a cover photo of two men drenched in oil as they attempted to close a faulty valve that was spraying a huge stream of crude skyward. Over the photo was the headline: "Drowning in oil." At the time it really did seem as if the world were drowning in oil.

The previous December crude oil on the New York Mercantile Exchange touched $10.72 per barrel. That month U.S. gasoline prices averaged 95 cents per gallon. "The Economist" opined that oil might go down to $5 per barrel.

But, of course, in retrospect the magazine's cover proved to be the perfect contrarian indicator, for oil had already begun its historic ascent toward $147 per barrel. The 2008 price spike was the culmination of a 10-year bull market that had begun in December 1998.

After dipping briefly to around $35 per barrel at the end of 2008 in the wake of the financial crisis, the new oil bull market sent world benchmark Brent Crude to a daily average of more than $100 per barrel for all of 2011, 2012 and 2013. Through October 27 the average daily price for this year has been $104.86, not all that different from the last three years.

The swift price decline of Brent Crude from $110 on July 1 to about $85 today has the media buzzing about a glut. But can oil which now trades at eight times its price in 1998--when there really was a glut--be said to be experiencing a glut now?

Certainly, there is more oil available than people are willing to pay $100 per barrel for. While there have been many explanations for the downward move in price, all we can say for sure is that recently there were more sellers than buyers; and so, the price slid as the buyers stepped away, waiting for the price to come down.

But, is this really a glut? In 1998, even what poor people were paying for oil and oil products was relatively affordable, making it easier for them to enjoy the power and comforts that cheap oil and cheap energy in general make available to individuals.

Now, the price of energy and oil, in particular, is leading some of the newly poor in Greece (made so by that country's ongoing economic depression) to seek out firewood--both legally and illegally obtained--to heat their homes instead of heating oil. The drop in vehicle miles traveled in the United States in recent years suggests that high gasoline prices are in part responsible for fewer miles traveled.

When it comes to total U.S. petroleum consumption, the top 10 weeks for consumption occurred from 2005 to 2007. The most recent consumption number (week ending October 24) remains 2 million barrels per day below the peak reading in 2005. European petroleum consumption remains in a downward trend as well. All this suggests a decline in the standard of living for most Americans and Europeans, at least, when it comes to oil and its benefits. (One colleague of mine now speaks of peak benefits from oil rather than peak oil.)

Yes, the price drop has only just occurred, and, of course, we can't expect that it will have an immediate affect on consumption. But, increased consumption would likely take the oil markets back above $100 per barrel since small changes in supply and demand tend to move the oil price sharply. At the $100 level no one would be calling the situation a glut.

The oil industry has been using the term "abundance" for years as a public relations ploy to prevent people from realizing that oil is neither cheap nor abundant anymore. But the word "glut" has produced night terrors in the minds of oil executives. "Glut" implies that investors should stay away from a market that cannot make them any money. "Abundance" is okay for industry television ads aimed at lulling the public and policymakers to sleep. But, "glut" is bad for business.

The real problem is that it is costing more and more to get the oil that remains out of the ground. Consumers will buy oil depending on their ability to pay, not on the price which the oil companies need to charge in order to cover the cost of producing it.

Ironically, the swoon in oil prices could easily lead to renewed price spikes as the price falls below the cost of producing the most expensive barrels of oil. Under such conditions, the industry will stop producing these barrels and supply will decline--leading to another price spike when demand picks up.

It turns out that between consumers who can't afford to pay higher and higher oil prices and companies which can't afford to produce the extra oil we'd like at lower prices, we are stuck in an ever-shrinking no man's land, a price band really--one that will eventually disappear as the average cost of producing the extra barrel of oil the world desires goes beyond what consumers including businesses can and will pay.

That will have us wondering why we allowed ourselves to sleepwalk through the last few years, even as continuing high prices and consumption declines sounded the alarm--one that told us we needed to speed up a transition to a renewable energy economy and reduce our energy use wherever possible instead of falling for talk of "abundance" and "glut."

Kurt Cobb is an author, speaker, and columnist focusing on energy and the environment. He is a regular contributor to the Energy Voices section of The Christian Science Monitor and author of the peak-oil-themed novel Prelude. In addition, he has written columns for the Paris-based science news site Scitizen, and his work has been featured on Energy Bulletin (now Resilience.org), The Oil Drum, OilPrice.com, Econ Matters, Peak Oil Review, 321energy, Common Dreams, Le Monde Diplomatique and many other sites. He maintains a blog called Resource Insights and can be contacted at kurtcobb2001@yahoo.com.

Sunday, October 26, 2014

Taking a short break--no post this week (and why)

I'm taking a short break. I expect to post again on Sunday, November 2.

Update Oct. 27, 2014:

Here's why I missed posting this week. I've been helping to publicize a new report by the Post Carbon Institute that takes aim at the Energy Department's rosy forecasts for tight oil and shale gas. That report is now available.

For the report, click here.

For the full media kit, click here.

(Full disclosure: I was a paid consultant for this publicity campaign. But, as my readers know, I've been saying for several years that the tight oil and shale gas boom would be short-lived. This report offers a broad and detailed analysis that supports that view.)

Sunday, October 19, 2014

Oil decline: Price makes the story

So oft in theologic wars,
The disputants, I ween,
Rail on in utter ignorance
Of what each other mean,
And prate about an Elephant
Not one of them has seen!
--The Blind Men and The Elephant by John Godfrey Saxe

When the world's business editors sent their reporters canvassing to find out what is behind the recent plunge in the world oil price, they were doing what they do almost every day for every type of market: stocks, bonds, currencies, commodities and real estate.

In financial journalism more often it's the price that makes the story rather than the story that makes the price. If a story is about something very surprising which almost no one can know in advance--a real scoop--say, an unexpected outcome in a major court case affecting a company's most profitable patent, then the story will move the price of the company's stock.

But much more often prices move, and then business editors send their reporters to find out why. Usually, a number of financial and industry professionals are asked: Why do you think prices went up/down? Then, the story is written and published.

However, on a daily basis, unless there is a big and obvious story like the one above, the only true answers are these:

There were more buyers than sellers. (UP)
There were more sellers than buyers. (DOWN)

These answers, of course, aren't really news. They are more like axioms.

The answers for the recent swoon in the oil price include:

  1. Oil is purchased in dollars and the dollar has been rising which puts downward pressure on the oil price.
  2. Demand is declining in Asia and Europe which is leaving excess oil on the market driving down the price.
  3. Growing production from the United States is adding to world oil supplies and bringing the price down.
  4. Libyan production has rebounded sharply following the country's recent period of unrest.
  5. Saudi Arabia, the only OPEC producer with significant additional production capacity, is pumping more oil to punish other OPEC members with a low price, a move designed to restore discipline among members so that they will abide by future oil production quotas.
  6. Saudi Arabia is pumping more oil to bring the price down to aid the United States in its diplomatic objectives, pressuring Russia, the world largest oil producer.
  7. Saudi Arabia isn't trying to help the United States; the kingdom is actually trying to hurt the United States and restore the exporter's dominance in the oil market by crushing the U.S. tight oil boom which requires high prices to be profitable.
  8. No, Saudi Arabia is really trying to help the United States in its fight against ISIS by showing its support for the United States and Europe through lowering oil prices and by making the price that ISIS gets for the oil products it now controls lower. The lower price is also harder on Iran which requires high prices to sustain its government revenues.
  9. Saudi Arabia is simply trying to defend its market share in the face of waning demand by continuing to pump oil at current levels and offering discounts to customers.

Of course, the above answers aren't necessarily mutually exclusive. People and countries can have multiple objectives served by the same action. And, some or all of the above assessments could be wrong or at least of very little explanatory value.

Now, I'll weigh in. It seems entirely likely that the Saudis are being opportunistic. Like many oil exporters, they need high oil export revenues to pay for their government expenditures, much of which consists of food and fuel subsidies and social programs designed to keep the public docile. In the face of what looks like declining demand, rather than cut production to maintain prices as they have done in the past, they've decided to maintain their market share worldwide by cutting prices. This has the benefit of making much American tight oil production uneconomic, thus discouraging new drilling.

The Saudis know something very important about the U.S. tight oil drillers. Most of them are independents who are loaded with debt and don't have the financial wherewithal to weather a period of sustained prices below their cost of production. They will quickly reduce their drilling to only those prospects which seem as if they might be profitable at these new lower prices.

That will pave the way for sustained higher world prices later as growth in U.S. oil production comes to a halt. After the damage is done, the Saudis will try to bring the price back up.

It's always possible that the Saudi strategy will fail because what's really happening may be the first stages of a colossal economic and financial crash that will take the world economy into prolonged recession. That would bring the price of oil down to levels not seen in a decade where they might stay for a considerable period.

I'm not predicting that. And, in fact, none of what I've written may have any validity. Even though the Saudis have publicly stated that they are defending their market share, they may not be telling us exactly what their aims are. Saudi acquiescence to lower oil prices may simply be having consequences the Saudis don't intend, but can't avoid.

In truth, the whole issue of oil prices is too complex and too lacking in transparency to be discussed intelligently when it comes to short-term price movements. I am reminded of the tale of the blind men and the elephant of which the last stanza of a poetic version is quoted above.

But, as I say, price makes the story.

Kurt Cobb is an author, speaker, and columnist focusing on energy and the environment. He is a regular contributor to the Energy Voices section of The Christian Science Monitor and author of the peak-oil-themed novel Prelude. In addition, he has written columns for the Paris-based science news site Scitizen, and his work has been featured on Energy Bulletin (now Resilience.org), The Oil Drum, OilPrice.com, Econ Matters, Peak Oil Review, 321energy, Common Dreams, Le Monde Diplomatique and many other sites. He maintains a blog called Resource Insights and can be contacted at kurtcobb2001@yahoo.com.

Sunday, October 12, 2014

World War III: It's here and energy is largely behind it

I've been advancing a thesis for several months with friends that World War III is now underway. It's just that it's not the war we thought it would be, that is, a confrontation between major powers with the possibility of a nuclear exchange. Instead, we are getting a set of low-intensity, on-again, off-again conflicts involving non-state actors (ISIS, Ukrainian rebels, Libyan insurgents) with confusing and in some cases nonexistent battle lines and rapidly shifting alliances such as the shift from fighting the Syrian regime to helping it indirectly by fighting ISIS, the regime's new foe.

There is at least one prominent person who seems to agree with me, the Pope. During a visit to a World War I memorial in Italy last month Pope Francis said: "Even today, after the second failure of another world war, perhaps one can speak of a third war, one fought piecemeal, with crimes, massacres, destruction."

In citing many well-known causes for war, he failed to specify the one that seems obvious in this case: the fight over energy resources. It can be no accident that the raging fights in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and the Ukraine all coincide with areas rich in energy resources or for which imported energy resources are at risk. There are other conflicts. But these are the ones that are transfixing the eyes of the world, and these are the ones in which major powers are taking sides and mounting major responses.

In Syria, Iraq and Libya, of course, it is oil and also natural gas that underlies the conflict. The ISIS forces in Syria and Iraq have seized oil refineries to power their advance. They and every fighting force in the world understands that oil is "liquid hegemony."

In the Ukraine natural gas supplies lurk in the background as rebels (supposedly with Russian help) fight to separate parts of eastern Ukraine from the country. The Russians who hold one of the largest reserves of natural gas in the world have threatened to cut off Ukraine, a large importer, this winter and to curtail supplies to Europe which depends on Russia for about 30 percent of its gas. The threat against Europe is in response to trade sanctions levied on Russia for its alleged role in helping Ukrainian insurgents.

Since summer, a friend and I have been periodically reviewing the World War III game board to assess whether the war is heating up or cooling down. The temperature changes as we have gauged them would look like a sine wave on a graph revealing no definitive trajectory. And, that is just the kind of war that I believe World War III will be--years of indecisive battles, diplomatic ploys, half-hearted engagement by major powers, and new, unexpected conflicts arising in unexpected places.

There are, of course, many other reasons for the conflicts I cite. But I wonder if the major powers would be much engaged in these conflicts if energy supplies were not at stake. So, the resource wars that are developing, especially those relating to energy, are not about direct conquest so much as concern about access to energy resources, or to put it more clearly, concern about possible interruptions to the flow of energy resources.

The low-intensity confrontation in the South China Sea between China and its neighbors, Vietnam and the Philippines, is the most prominent dispute over actual ownership of energy resources rather than the mere flow of those resources. But in the article cited, the Indians, while laying no claim to resources in that area, have said publicly that they are worried that shipping through the South China Sea could be affected if the conflict heats up. Again, we are back to concern about the flow of resources by countries not directly a party to the dispute--yet.

Traditional diplomacy among great powers does not seem to have been effective at resolving these conflicts. And, traditional military operations seem less than effective as well. Kurds in Syria report that U.S. airstrikes against ISIS are not working. This conflict and others like it which are characterized by poorly defined boundaries, shifting participants and unclear goals are confounding major powers and wreaking havoc on countries where these conflicts rage.

One of the most obvious strategies for responding to these conflicts--deep, rapid and permanent reductions in fossil fuel energy consumption through efficiency measures, conservation, and expansion of renewable energy--does not seem to be a prominent part of the policy mix. Such a reduction would not necessarily cause these conflicts to disappear; but they might become far less dangerous since the major powers would be less interested in them and thus less likely to make a miscalculation that would lead to a larger global conflict.

That is the danger that lies in my version of World War III--that it could morph into the kind of global conflict that risks nuclear confrontation between major powers--not because those powers would seek such an obviously insane outcome, but because they might miscalculate and by mistake push the conflict in this terrible direction.

It is not clear how this danger can be avoided given the current trajectory of world energy use. And, it is not clear how to get the world's leaders to focus on the obvious need to reduce not only fossil fuel energy use, but use of all the world's nonrenewable resources in order to forestall conflict.* That humans can have good lives without perpetual growth in the consumption of resources is simply not a possibility in the minds of most world leaders. And that means we should prepare for a very long World War III.

______________________________________________________________

*Such reductions imply the reorganization of our daily lives with an emphasis on conservation as an ingrained habit. They also imply significant changes to our infrastructure. But they do not necessarily mean that we cannot have the essential services that the current system provides while using far less in the way of inputs. The main impediments to moving rapidly down this road are vested interests such as the fossil fuel industry which profit from the current wildly inefficient and wasteful global system. I agree that this is no small obstacle.

Kurt Cobb is an author, speaker, and columnist focusing on energy and the environment. He is a regular contributor to the Energy Voices section of The Christian Science Monitor and author of the peak-oil-themed novel Prelude. In addition, he has written columns for the Paris-based science news site Scitizen, and his work has been featured on Energy Bulletin (now Resilience.org), The Oil Drum, OilPrice.com, Econ Matters, Peak Oil Review, 321energy, Common Dreams, Le Monde Diplomatique and many other sites. He maintains a blog called Resource Insights and can be contacted at kurtcobb2001@yahoo.com.

Sunday, October 05, 2014

Irony alert: Yergin gets award named after peak oil realist Schlesinger

Where is George Orwell when you need him?

It is a supreme irony that cornucopian oil industry mouthpiece and consultant Daniel Yergin should receive America's first medal for energy security named after James Schlesinger, the first U.S. energy secretary. For those not familiar with the late Dr. Schlesinger's views, in a keynote speech he told attendees at a 2007 conference sponsored by the Association for the Study of Peak Oil (ASPO) the following:

Conceptually, the battle is over. The peakists have won. I was sitting next to an oil executive in New Mexico just recently, and he said to the audience, "Of course, I'm a peakist. We're all peakists. I just don't know when the peak comes." But that represents part of a conceptual victory. And, therefore to the peakists I say, you can declare victory. You are no longer the beleaguered, small minority of voices crying in the wilderness. You are now mainstream. You must learn to take yes for an answer and be gracious in victory.

This was not a one-off announcement from Schlesinger. Nor did he fail to understand the context in which he was speaking for he said it all over again in 2010 at a conference sponsored by the U.S. affiliate of ASPO:

Some five years ago in Italy, I concluded a talk by saying that like the inhabitants of Pompeii, who ignored the neighboring volcano Vesuvius until it detonated, the world ignores peak oil at its peril.

Naturally, Yergin completely ignored the contradiction between his views and Schlesinger's in accepting the award from the U.S. Department of Energy. But, it is difficult to understand just exactly how Yergin contributed to American energy security. This is the man who throughout the last decade kept predicting a flood of new oil that would send oil prices plummeting. That flood never appeared. Because of his vast influence, Yergin led a chorus of voices telling the United States and the world that there was nothing to worry about, that we didn't need to prepare for an era of constrained oil supplies and high oil prices. And, this is the foresight that has earned him a national award from the Energy Department for aiding our energy security?

In the news piece cited above Yergin behaves as if he foresaw the shale boom in oil and natural gas in the United States. But, back in 2003 in an article for "Foreign Affairs," he advocated a vast expansion of import capacity for liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the United States because "[i]n the next five years, it is likely to become a large gas importer; within ten years, it will overtake Japan as the world's largest." I'm not sure how this gem would have helped U.S. energy security either. To show that it was taken seriously, the Congressional Research Service in a report to Congress cited Yergin's article as evidence of the need to expand U.S. LNG import capacity.

Likewise, Yergin's advocacy for repealing a decades-old ban on U.S. crude oil exports--even as America imports about half its crude needs--seems entirely calculated to profit the industry (which can get higher prices for its light sweet crude abroad) rather than secure America's energy future.

So, on oil Yergin got it wrong, way wrong. On natural gas he got it wrong, 180 degrees wrong if we take his current position as a guide. Today, Yergin is touting the need to prepare to EXPORT U.S. natural gas to the rest of the world. This is no surprise since it is the position of his clients in the gas industry who would benefit from the higher prices available on the world market for gas. But, it seems quite obvious that exporting U.S.-produced natural gas would detract from, not enhance American energy security, a fact that is apparently lost on the Energy Department.

When oil was vaulting toward its highest price ever in mid-2008, Yergin felt he had to say something, and what he wrote for the "Financial Times" was essentially an explanation of why he believed he had so badly botched his previous calls. Suddenly, he was advocating energy efficiency and biofuels. He foresaw oil losing some of its dominance as transportation fuel. He also did an about-face on oil prices and for the very first time in the decade forecast RISING oil prices.

What we see then is a man who tries to save face when events show him to be embarrassingly wrong and who shills for the industry he represents the rest of the time. But all of the time the media and public treat him as if he were a disinterested party, only concerned about national and international well-being, an independent analyst who is in thrall to no one.

However, Yergin's company, Cambridge Energy Research Associates (later acquired by IHS, Inc.), has always had major oil companies as clients. Even so, pronouncements from Yergin are not worthless. Rather, they should be viewed as a barometer of thinking in the oil industry. And, anything Yergin says which seems contrary to or, at least, beyond the interests of that industry is meant to maintain his image as an independent analyst, an image that was never consistent with his actual consulting work.

Daniel Yergin is a talented storyteller. He won the Pulitzer for his history of oil entitled The Prize. At any given moment, however, it's important to understand what story he is telling and on whose behalf he is telling it. That he is little concerned with anyone's security except that of his clients is obvious from his previous public statements and his long career of carrying water for the oil and gas industry.

Given all this, perhaps the most puzzling thing about Daniel Yergin is his mystifying ability to inflict amnesia on people regarding his previous pronouncements and predictions. It is this ability, it seems, that has made it possible for him to thrive as a consultant (despite his abysmal forecasting record) and to be the first recipient of an award, the Schlesinger Medal for Energy Security, named after a man whose views on the future of oil are very much the opposite of Yergin's.

Kurt Cobb is an author, speaker, and columnist focusing on energy and the environment. He is a regular contributor to the Energy Voices section of The Christian Science Monitor and author of the peak-oil-themed novel Prelude. In addition, he has written columns for the Paris-based science news site Scitizen, and his work has been featured on Energy Bulletin (now Resilience.org), The Oil Drum, OilPrice.com, Econ Matters, Peak Oil Review, 321energy, Common Dreams, Le Monde Diplomatique and many other sites. He maintains a blog called Resource Insights and can be contacted at kurtcobb2001@yahoo.com.