Road to nowhere?

Last week I attended a hearing on the transportation plan for my county for the year 2030. Similar plans are mandated by federal law for most localities in the United States. Though not explicit, the assumption behind our plan is that liquid fuels will remain cheap and abundant through 2030 and beyond. I suspect that most of the nation's transportation planners share this assumption and that therefore most of the country's transportation plans embrace it.

Below are comments I presented before my local transportation planning agency concerning its 2030 plan. I hope these comments will provide some ideas for those who want to comment on plans in their own locales. My planning agency goes by the rather strange name of Kalamazoo Area Transportation Study though a web search reveals that several agencies use this format for their names, for example, Chicago Area Transportation Study. Many also use the generic term for such agencies, metropolitan planning organization, tacked onto the name of the area covered by the plan, for example, Metropolitan Planning Organization for the Miami Urbanized Area. For a list of such agencies, check the Association of Metropolitan Planning Organizations website.

These planning organizations meet frequently and provide many opportunities for citizen input. Some jurisdictions may be beyond the comment period for their long-range plans; but, transportation planners are essentially planning all the time, so virtually any time would be appropriate to bring energy issues to their attention.

Below are the comments which I read before the Kalamazoo Area Transportation Study or KATS on March 29:

Good evening. My name is Kurt Cobb and I live in the city of Kalamazoo. I am neither a scientist nor an engineer. Rather, I am concerned citizen who also happens to write frequently about energy and environmental issues.

Transportation planners (like many of the rest of us) desperately want to know the one thing which they cannot know: the future. I understand that KATS is obliged by law to look out decades into the future and attempt to anticipate the transportation needs of this county. And, I understand that this plan will evolve over time as the future unfolds. I also understand that the planning process is necessary and useful for soliciting public input. None of us would be here today if we did not have something to comment on.

That said, history teaches us that the future is the domain of unexpected events and discredited predictions. In our technologically driven society, a forecaster predicting the outlines of our world 20 or even 10 years from now would, for example, have to know about all the inventions of the coming decade or two and their effect on society. This, of course, would mean that the forecaster would be very close to inventing all those inventions right now which means he or she would really be talking about the present and not the future.

Still, there are some things, such as our sprawling transportation infrastructure, which cannot be planned on a napkin the night before construction begins and so we must try to guess at a future whose outlines are beyond knowing with any specificity.

My aim this evening is not to comment on the details of the 2030 transportation plan, but rather to question one of its tacit and yet critical assumptions, namely, that liquid fuels will remain abundant and cheap through the year 2030. There are many reasons to believe that we cannot count on cheap, abundant liquid fuels in the decades to come. I will get to those in a moment.

First, let me say something about the asymmetry of the risks we face in transportation planning for this county or really for any place that relies on motorized transport. If the most optimistic predictions about the availability of liquid fuels in 2030 are realized, it is possible that this plan will not provide enough new roads to handle all of the traffic that will result. So, the risks are that the roads in Kalamazoo County would end up choked with cars and trucks for some time until additional roads could be built. However, if the most pessimistic predictions about the availability of liquid fuels are realized, we will be living in a completely different world. Instead of clogged highways and roads, we will find empty expanses of crumbling asphalt that may have limited use as bike paths or walkways, but which will have turned out to be a mammoth waste of resources in an energy-constrained world. The age of the private automobile will be over.

No one knows which of these two outcomes will occur or whether something in-between will result. But, it is clear by comparing the two most extreme scenarios that the risks we face are wildly asymmetrical, that is, one scenario would reveal the plan we have before us as a colossal planning failure while the other would demonstrate that it was somewhat inadequate, but not necessarily incorrect in its general direction.

This is why I would advocate that future plans incorporate an explicit energy supply forecast with lower and upper bounds. (Price is less relevant than supply since price merely rations supply and fluctuates based on immediate demand.) If this is done, the plan will in all likelihood have to include various plans based on various scenarios for energy availability. In this way, policymakers could determine the most prudent course based a range of outcomes rather than trying to do something which none of us can do: Predict the future precisely.

Now, let me say a few words about a why I believe we may not be able to count on cheap, abundant liquid fuels. I say liquid fuels because nearly all transportation worldwide runs on liquid fuels. There is a tiny, but increasing portion that runs on electricity and this type of energy may offer a path for replacing at least part of the liquid fuel I expect us to lose in the next couple of decades.

First, we must understand that 86 percent of the world's primary energy supply comes from fossil fuels: coal, natural gas and oil. (I say primary energy supply because electricity, for example, is an energy carrier and thus classed as a secondary energy supply and not an energy source.) Fossil fuels are made from organic material, much of it deposited hundreds of millions of years ago in seabeds and on land. They are continuously being made in the Earth's crust, but at rates that are so slow that this replenishment has no significance for humans living now or any time in the next several million years. In other words, fossil fuels are for all practical purposes finite.

What this means is that for all fossil fuel resources the world will reach a peak in the rate of production followed by an irreversible decline. No amount of effort, no price, no new technology will work to stop the decline although these things may help to moderate it. Surprisingly, this peak will occur even as huge reserves still lie in the ground. But it is the rate at which we can get them out of the ground that is crucial, for everything in society today depends on our ability to support economic growth by continuously increasing the rate of production of our primary energy sources, especially fossil fuels.

As it turns out, natural gas in North America appears to have peaked already at about 27 trillion cubic feet per year, running along a production plateau since about 1998. This is despite very high prices and unprecedented drilling efforts. And, a moratorium on development of the world's largest natural gas field in Qatar containing 14 percent of the world's reserves has called into question whether the growth in liquefied natural gas supplies will be sufficient to satisfy both North American and Asian demand growth. The idea that natural gas turned into liquid fuels will provide a significant substitute for declining fuels derived from petroleum should be regarded with considerable skepticism.

As for oil, peak projections range from 2005, meaning, of course, that it's already happened, to 2037, an estimate provided by the U. S. Energy Information Administration and the one most often cited by the optimists. But the EIA estimate should be taken with a grain of salt. This is the same agency that missed the peak in American domestic oil production in 1970 and predicted growing supplies of natural gas throughout this decade. No matter what date you believe world peak oil production will occur--and there is going to be a peak and then a decline at some point--perhaps more important than any exacting prognostication as to the time of the peak is an evaluation of what it would take to make up our deficit in liquid fuels after the peak.

It turns out that the U. S. Department of Energy has already undertaken such a study, and it makes for sobering reading. Commonly referred to as the Hirsch Report after its principal author, Robert Hirsch, the report concludes the following: It will take a crash program to develop alternative fuels and implement conservation measures starting 20 years in advance of the peak to avoid significant societal and economic disruptions resulting from a shortfall in liquid fuel volumes. This is regardless of when the peak occurs. So, even if the optimists are right, we have little time left to start making the transition, and, of course, changing our transportation system to accommodate these new realities.

Let me cover briefly various panaceas that are currently being offered. First, there are known methods for turning coal into liquid fuels, and we are said to have a 250-year supply of coal in the United States. These methods are very carbon intensive and therefore have implications for global warming. But I'm not going to address that issue here, though I believe any intelligent energy supply forecast will have to take into account the near certainty of carbon emission limits. But setting aside the global warming implications, is there really that much coal left? A new independent study produced by the German-based Energy Working Group tells us, for instance, that Chinese coal reserve data hasn't been updated since 1992 even though 20 percent of those reserves have presumably been produced. This is no small matter since China is supposed to have one of the largest coal reserves in the world. There are similar anomalies all over the globe including the curious fact that while annual coal tonnage in the U. S. continues to climb, the total energy content of that coal has been declining since 1998.

Second, biofuels are often touted as a replacement for gasoline and diesel. Even if all the corn grown in the United States were converted to ethanol, it would supply only 7 percent of our liquid fuel needs. Only if all the arable land in North America were put under oilseed cultivation could we fuel the North American vehicle fleet with the much vaunted biodiesel. In other words, we could drive, but we couldn't eat. (Here I'm assuming, of course, that the entire fleet has been converted to diesel.) But, there are serious questions about whether both of these biofuels are actually energy losers, that is, they require more energy to produce than they return which would make them a drain on our current fossil fuel resources.

Third, the words "hydrogen economy" are now frequently heard from the lips of politicians and policymakers. Alas, hydrogen is not an energy source. There are no hydrogen mines. There are currently two ways to make hydrogen: strip it from natural gas which is already in short supply or make it through the electrolysis of water. And, that means, of course, that you need another energy source to make the electricity which in turn means that hydrogen is an energy loser. In addition, there are huge problems with storage and transport. But, beyond this is something that may have escaped your notice. All the talk earlier this decade about hydrogen cars has quieted down considerably as major carmakers have either drastically scaled back their research or abandoned it altogether. The major reason: the technological hurdles are much larger than anyone had assumed.

This leaves us for the moment with electricity. I believe we must begin a serious effort to electrify our transportation system and save what dwindling liquid fuels we will have for only three purposes: emergency vehicles, rural transport and farm machinery.

While hybrid cars are a start and plug-in hybrids may become commonplace within the next several years, I believe we will need to go far beyond the private automobile. After all, half of the energy that a car will ever use has already been used by the first time you take it for drive. In an energy-constrained world, it seems doubtful that we will be able to provide private automobile transportation to the masses, even if it is electrically powered. We will instead need to electrify our public transportation system and vastly expand it. We desperately need to expand greatly our intercity passenger rail service and add to our freight rail service while electrifying both. We need to bring more electrified rapid transit to our cities similar to the SkyTrain system found in Vancouver.

The electricity we will need will have to come from wind and solar, and possibly some nuclear, if we are to avoid the catastrophic consequences of global warming. Fortunately for us, Lake Michigan is one of the greatest wind resources in the world and large, state-of-the-art wind turbines placed inland from the lake and near major electrical infrastructure have the potential to power much of the Midwest.

If we move forward with the electrification of transportation, and it later turns out that liquid fuels are in ample supply, I think there will be many advantages and few disadvantages to having done so. On the other hand, if we are passing into the post-petroleum age, we will be obliged, in my view, to replace the notion of consumer preference--which is clearly an artifact of the oil age--with the notion of societal necessity.

This is only a cursory look at the problem of liquid fuel supplies and one possible solution, the electrification of transport. But, I hope it will stimulate the curiosity of the people who plan our transportation system to examine energy issues more closely as they proceed with their very important work.

Thank you.

Economists are from Mediocristan

Mediocristan is a mythical land inhabited by economists (and other social scientists) who believe that the world's events fit neatly beneath a bell curve of outcomes. Economists live in this land not because they are mediocre--in fact, they are decidedly less than mediocre in their prognostications--but because they accept one very crucial idea. They believe that extreme outcomes such as market crashes and other major discontinuities in our economic life are so rare that we can all but ignore them.

Mediocristan is an invention of the mind of Nassim Nicholas Taleb, a hedge fund manager and self-styled philosopher of uncertainty. His most recent book, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, provides an entertaining and thoroughly readable critique of how most of us have been taught to think about risk.

Taleb doesn't address oil depletion, global warming or other resource or environmental issues directly. But much of what he says turns out to be useful for those trying to assess risks in such areas.

Economists often like to insist that risk can be easily quantified and that future economic scenarios will be played out within the bounds dictated by models. But risk cannot be easily quantified except in cases where the possible outcomes are already known. An example would be a game involving dice. There are only six possibilities on each die so the range of outcomes (assuming perfect dice) is already known. As for economic models, they are usually backtested which means that they are tested using historical data. First, historical data, probabilistically speaking, represent only one possible outcome among many outcomes. Second, historical data are very unlikely to reflect the dynamics of world peak oil production or global warming since peak by definition happens only once and the effect of global warming on the economy is a wildcard for the future.

The admission that economists are from Mediocristan is sometimes made explicit. This piece lays out many of the arguments frequently used by economists when discussing world peak oil production. But rather than focus here on the counterarguments, let me call your attention to the following sentence in that piece: "Remember that barring any unforeseen tragedy or deliberate measure to limit the supply of oil, the supply will not drop suddenly, meaning that the price will not rise suddenly."

It is precisely this type of risk that peak oil theorists are pointing to, risks of an extreme outcome that could be very disruptive to modern society. The sentence quoted above explains in part why economists and those concerned about peak oil often talk past one another. Economists start by discarding extreme outcomes. Those concerned about the possible severe consequences resulting from peak oil focus on extreme outcomes.

So then, who's right? The rather unfortunate answer is that both are right if you stay within the confines of their assumptions. So you need to figure out which assumptions better reflect the world we live in. The economists are assuming that no unforeseen, disruptive event will occur that causes a dramatic and relatively sudden fall in oil supplies. (They are also assuming rather better knowledge than we actually have about oil reserves.) Those concerned about peak oil think we should look for clues foreshadowing such a disruptive shortfall and take out some insurance in the form of concerted action on conservation and the development of alternative fuels. In other words, most of those pounding the table about peak oil do not believe that the marketplace will solve the problem.

Using Taleb's words, the arrival of peak oil in the near future could be considered a "black swan." The black swan is a metaphor for a rare and unforeseen event that has an extreme impact. Of course, a fair number of people now believe peak oil is imminent. But the vast majority of the world's population knows nothing about peak oil or believes that it is something for the distant future. And, it is expectations among the populace at large that make the impact of such an event extreme (since very few people are, by definition, prepared for it).

Taleb has admitted to making a bet on peak oil, but not one that most people would expect. In keeping with his principle that we cannot really know the future, but that we can expect people to underestimate the number and impact of extreme events, he has bet on two extreme outcomes: very cheap oil and very expensive oil within the next few years. (He does this using the options market, and his record shows that he does not have to be right about any one bet very often to do well financially.)

By doing so, he at least demonstrates a principle that lies behind the thinking of peak oil believers, namely, that it's worth taking out insurance against seemingly unlikely events if their impact could be very severe. And, that places peak oil believers in the other mythical world which Taleb calls Extremistan. In that world unforeseen, extreme, but still rare events happen more often than anyone can calculate. Their consequences are so large that they alter considerably the previously assumed average results for such events.

In the world of easy-to-tally physical measurements such as height and weight, the chance of extreme outcomes that can alter the average is quite small, Taleb explains. We are very unlikely to find a human being who is 100 feet tall or who weighs 10,000 pounds. This is the proper place for using techniques from Mediocristan. But in the world of social and economic affairs where so many factors are unknown and the dynamics of the system are so unruly, exceptional and unexpected events are the ones we should be thinking about because they are the ones that change the course of history. (Oil depletion must be classed within this realm since economic trends, political decisions and technological change as well as geological constraints are all important factors in analyzing it.)

Taleb adds that, by definition, no one can forecast a "black swan" event. Its very nature is that it is unexpected. But he believes we can acknowledge the existence of such events and try to mitigate the damage of "bad" black swans while exposing ourselves to "good" black swans. In the case of oil depletion, a good black swan might be an invention that makes an electrically powered transportation system very easy to deploy and run.

Taleb tells us that financial models based on the bell curve would have predicted that a stock market drop similar to the 1987 crash would occur once every several billion lifetimes of the universe. And, it is from people relying on such models, who believe in the magic of the marketplace (under ideal bell-curve conditions with no "unforeseen tragedies"!), that we now get confident pronouncements that peak oil is nothing to worry about, even if it's here.

Somehow, I don't take any comfort in that.

Peak oil forecasts and asymmetrical risk

It's fun to predict what life will be like 30 or even 50 years from now. There's a steady market for it, both for the optimistic version--designed mostly to make people feel good (or less bad) about destructive behaviors--and the apocalyptic version--designed primarily to bring converts into certain religions and social movements. Until the day approaches, the forecaster doesn't have to account for his or her prediction. Sometimes the forecaster is dead when the date arrives, and no one remembers what he or she said. Or if the forecast is vague enough, it is reinterpreted to explain what is happening, and any followers then feel vindicated.

Oracular pronouncements have become a staple in discussions of peak oil, global warming and other environmental issues. The problem with any forecast, however, is that its accuracy degrades rather quickly the further one projects into the future. This is because our society is characterized by rapid technological change and contained, like all societies, within a complex natural system. It would have been pretty easy to forecast the basic conditions for human beings starting 100,000 years ago for the 5,000 years that followed. People would be living in small groups of hunter-gatherers at the beginning of this period and at the end. But, things were much simpler back then, and nobody really needed a forecaster.

Any long-term forecast today, however, requires that someone predicting the next, say, 20 or even 10 years, would have to know in advance about every major invention. And, if a forecaster already knew this, he or she would be very close to inventing those inventions. The inventions then would not be something for the future, but really for the present. (I am indebted to Nassim Nicholas Taleb, author of The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, for this obvious--once you hear it--insight. It doesn't, however, seem to be obvious to people who call themselves futurists.)

Those concerned with natural systems run into an additional problem. Predicting the trajectory of complex natural systems and their reactions to technological and social change is also exceedingly difficult.

But, forget about the future for a moment. Contemplate how difficult it is to figure out what is going on in the present with our very limited understanding of both the social and natural systems that surround us. So, does this mean that it is hopeless to even think about the future? The short answer is "no." My attempt at a long answer is as follows.

First, humans seem uniquely designed for thinking about events which haven't yet happened. They can imagine how they would react to such events or plan some future course of action that they believe will create their desired outcome. However, as anybody who has lived long enough already knows, nothing ever goes according to plan. Even so, planning can prepare us for contingencies that would otherwise confound us in the heat of action.

Second, even though the precise outlines of the future cannot be ascertained, we can imagine several scenarios within which the future is likely to unfold. While examining various scenarios gives us no precise estimates of risk, at least it gives an indication about the character of those risks. Are the upsides and downsides of the scenarios consequential? In other words, will they affect society much either way? If they are consequential, is the advantage or harm implied by favorable and unfavorable outcomes of equal magnitude? Or is one outcome disproportionately good or bad?

A simple way to explain this is as follows. If I risk getting a hangnail in pursuing a course of action, I will act differently than if I risk getting my arm cut off. It is just such an analysis of risk that deserves consideration in the peak oil debate and in other important debates such as how to respond to global warming.

Here's what such an analysis might look like with regard to peak oil. Let's say the range of predictions about how much oil will be flowing worldwide in 2025 goes from 50 percent less than is being pumped today to 50 percent more. Since oil is not an intellectual product, but rather a physical one that requires considerable work to find, pump, and refine, it is probably safe to assume that we will not be pumping 1,000 percent more than today. Nor is it likely--given what we can ascertain about reserves in the ground today--that we will be producing anything approaching 100 percent less or, in other words, nothing. (Naturally, one could concoct extremely unlikely scenarios in which, for example, aliens teach us how to turn seawater into conventional oil at 3 cents a gallon or conversely, a plague wipes out all human beings who then, of course, cease to pump any oil.)

Within these bounds of 50 percent less and 50 percent more, we can imagine what the consequences might be. A world with 50 percent more oil will probably look like an extension of today's world with a lot more Chinese and Indians driving cars. (I'm not considering global warming as an issue in this example.) A world with 50 percent less oil will certainly be experiencing extreme difficulties. Unless suitable and inexpensive substitutes for petroleum-derived fuels have become widely available, the price of such fuels will be considerably higher. The costs associated with products such as plastics made from oil-derived feedstocks may become prohibitive for many users. Our complex transportation and agricultural systems which are dependent on cheap liquid fuels and oil-based chemicals such as herbicides will be in considerable distress. They may provide neither the level of transportation for goods and people to which we have become accustomed, nor the necessary quantities of food to feed those people.

Clearly, the downside of the pessimistic forecast cannot be equated with the hangnail mentioned above. It must be classed with the amputation.

Those who pooh-pooh such a comparison are likely to call the pessimistic forecast a scare tactic. But remember, no one can possibly know with any precision what worldwide oil output will be in 2025, and no one can confidently ascertain whether technological changes will substantially mitigate--through efficiencies and substitutions--any reduction in oil supplies. In fact, there are sound reasons to doubt that such mitigation will be possible on such a short time scale, even if we ignore the problem of carbon emissions. (A report commissioned by the U. S. Department of Energy, now commonly referred to as the Hirsch report, is probably the most definitive attempt to look at near-term mitigation. It casts doubt on whether we will make sufficient strides at mitigation even if peak oil doesn't occur until the dates offered by the most optimistic scenarios.)

The scenarios we use to peer into the future don't have to be precise in order for us to glean a considerable amount of information from them by contemplating the consequences of each. If the downside of the pessimistic forecast could readily be dismissed as minor, then we could probably (but not with complete certainty) set aside our anxieties.

But such is not the case. The downside of a large reduction in oil supplies is so monumental that it could cripple modern, technological civilization and even initiate a cascade of failures that lead to a long-term downward spiral. In short, the risks posed by pessimistic and optimist scenarios in the peak oil debate are wildly asymmetrical. The downside consequences are possibly civilization-wrecking, while the benefits of the upside can be broadly characterized as nothing more than allowing business as usual to proceed. It's no wonder that optimistic scenarios are popular among such deeply entrenched business interests as the fossil fuel, automotive and utility industries. They would all be hurt by a rapid transition to a sustainable transportation system and a sustainable energy economy.

It is worth asking the oil optimists why they buy insurance for their homes and cars to protect them in case of catastrophe, but refuse to support taking out insurance for society as whole in the form of investing in a sustainable economy. The optimists may complain that we have much more time to make the transition than the pessimists say and that a rapid transition would be unnecessarily costly for society. If this is their argument, then it amounts to nothing more than saying that the main danger we face is creating a sustainable society before we actually have to--a process that will end up hurting some business interests while benefitting others.

For my own part, I can live with that risk!

James Lovelock's strange bedfellows

Scientist James Lovelock stunned the scientific community last year with his assertion that it is too late to do anything about global warming. Even if we have not yet reached the tipping point, he said, the vast momentum of industrial society will soon carry us crashing through it and dash any hope of arresting a deadly planetary heat wave that will wreck civilization as we know it. Lovelock detailed his assessment in a new book entitled The Revenge of Gaia: Earth's Climate Crisis and the Fate of Humanity.

Lovelock is no ordinary researcher. He is a world renown independent scientist and inventor. One of his inventions helped to uncover the role of chlorofluorocarbons in the destruction of the ozone layer. He is probably most famous for his thesis that the Earth is a living organism that regulates its temperature and conditions to make the biosphere amenable to life. He explained his theory in a book published almost 30 years ago entitled Gaia: A New Look at Life On Earth.

At the other end of the spectrum of the global warming debate are the so-called climate change skeptics. They have been known to employ something akin to a modified dog-bite defense. In a classic joke a man whose dog has bitten a passerby defends himself in court by saying: "My dog doesn't bite, it wasn't my dog, and furthermore, I don't have a dog." And, so it is with the so-called climate skeptics. They claim variously that global warming is good for you or at least not so bad that we need to do anything about it; that global warming is not caused by human activity; and that furthermore, there's no global warming.

Most of the skeptics, which comprise a small and dwindling group of scientists and a much larger contingent of professional propagandists, have strong financial ties to the fossil fuel industry. Their intent is not to enlighten, but to confuse and thereby delay any action that could inflict financial pain on their benefactors. But with the evidence so overwhelming that a worldwide warming trend is underway, the skeptics have largely dropped the third part of their modified dog-bite defense. Instead, they've to begun to focus on the second part, namely, that global warming is not caused by human activity. It is here that they have unwittingly walked into a trap. And, it is here they now find themselves in the same camp as Lovelock.

Lovelock's essential point is that humans can no longer do anything about global warming. This is because we have reached or will shortly reach the point at which the Earth's processes will begin to greatly amplify and accelerate warming without any need for further inputs from us. This is often called runaway global warming. It is the point at which the Earth's climate switch has been flipped and after which there is no hope of going back to our former climate. And, it is the reason that climate scientists are calling for immediate action on deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions in hopes of avoiding flicking this planetary switch.

Lovelock, of course, thinks it's too late. Now, the only thing to do, he counsels, is to adapt. But ironically, the so-called skeptics' main argument has become essentially the same. Of course, they arrive at their conclusion through a different route: Humans aren't causing global warming, so they can't really do anything to stop it. But this is really only another way of saying that we may have entered runaway global warming. The causes cited include increased solar radiation and cyclical warming of the Earth unrelated to human activity. The skeptics cite the geologic record as proof that the Earth periodically undergoes such warmings, and that it's nothing to get excited about. Although the first part of this statement is true, it does not constitute proof that this warmup is natural. The second part of the statement, however, deserves special scrutiny. That's because, inconveniently, the geologic record is full of sudden, dramatic climate shifts, some occurring in as short a period as a decade.

With global warming on a dangerously accelerated schedule, Lovelock believes that governments and societies have no time to lose. They must begin planning now to secure energy and food supplies. They must brace themselves for early and dramatic rises in sea level. He also believes that basic knowledge must now be committed to long-lasting, durable books that won't deteriorate over time. The computer-driven, electricity-filled life we currently lead will not survive the massive dieoff that he predicts will leave only "a few breeding pairs" in the Arctic by the end of the century.

Since the skeptics and Lovelock are now basically in agreement that nothing can be done to stop global warming, why haven't the skeptics outlined a plan for adaptation (even emergency adaptation) as Lovelock has? Perhaps the skeptics are falling back on the first part of their modified dog-bite defense that global temperatures won't rise enough so that we need to do anything to adapt. But, this does not square with their almost constant assertions that there is a great deal of uncertainty about future temperature rises. While true, the uncertainty runs in both directions. Global temperature rises could just as easily turn out to be much higher by the end of the century than current estimates. But so heedless are the skeptics of their own contradictory thinking that in testimony before the U. S. Congress one bona fide climate scientist who styles himself a skeptic simply deleted the median and high temperature estimates from a study done by NASA's famed climate researcher, James Hansen.

The fact that the climate change contrarians 1) have no plan for adaptation to a warming climate; 2) ignore the obvious warnings of the geologic record they cite; 3) claim that the future of climate change is terribly uncertain and then claim to know it with certainty; and 4) deploy mutually contradictory arguments supports the widespread belief that they have a rather narrow agenda, namely, to defeat any attempts to curb greenhouse gas emissions.

But this still leaves them in the same camp as Lovelock (albeit by different reasoning), a position that cries out for a credible plan of adaptation based on the great uncertainties that the skeptics themselves admit surround the future of global warming. Just to be safe, however, I'm not going to hold my breath waiting for them to give me such a plan.

The Point of Despair

I recently gave a talk to a college audience on what I called the hidden role of energy in every environmental problem. As part of my presentation I went through a depressing list of environmental problems and showed their connection to our energy use. The next day I received a message from an audience member who clearly understood the implications of my talk, but who bemoaned my failure to provide practical solutions. He said I had left the students feeling hopeless.

This unfortunate result was partly a problem of scheduling. Most of the students attending needed to leave early to go to other presentations that evening on campus. Those who stayed did have some opportunity to discuss possible responses. I say "responses," because I don't believe our ecological predicament has any solutions by which people normally mean that we can solve our problems and then go back to business as usual. Instead, we are left with responses--responses which may prove valuable or worthless, but the results of which cannot be known in advance. In short, there are no guarantees that our responses will work. By "work" I mean allow us to maintain the semblance of a technically advanced human civilization.

It's no surprise that such a realization brings many people to the point of despair. Of course, if they remain there, they can accomplish nothing. But, let's not hurry forward. Let's dwell on that despair for a moment. Does it have a function? I think it does. It is at the point of despair that people can feel deep down their connection to all that has come before them and all that will come after. It is not just their personal futures that are at stake anymore. It is the whole project of human civilization, the art, the literature, the philosophy, the great works of architecture, the great institutions of learning and research, the huge store of human knowledge, and the ongoing experiment in self-government. It is also the future of the natural world, not just what it can provide for our sustenance, but also the beauty and diversity that result from its own purposes.

It is no wonder that such an understanding brings with it what seems like an unbearable burden. Indeed, for some people this is the very first time their personal ambitions shrink as their link to the social and natural world greatly expands. To feel that link strongly can be overwhelming. It brings with it a sense of responsibility, the size of which seems immense. The moment seems to say, "If I am linked to all of this, I am somehow responsible for it." But how can one lone person even make a dent in the immense challenges humankind faces?

The question certainly reflects a state of despair; but it is in this state that we can become aware of our connection to the greater world. Without that connection nothing important can be accomplished when it comes to sustainability. With it, in my view, genuine work can begin without hubris; with respect for the size of the task; with the realization that each person can only do a part of the job; and with a sense of solidarity with other humans and with the natural world.

So, how can a person who has been brought to the point of despair take the next step? For those who are late in life, it is often an easy step. I've puzzled over why the older a person is, the more likely her or she is to be concerned about peak oil, global warming and sustainability in general. I've discovered two reasons. First, age teaches us limits in ways that no words can. Second, those in the late stages of life think of their children and grandchildren, and they begin to act out of love.

As for young people, Richard Louv, author of Last Child in the Woods, has a suggestion. He says that every generation likes to think that it will change the world. This generation has to change the world. Everything must change, he explains. That's the kind of invitation that an idealistic young person would find difficult to pass up. No matter what his or her interest--engineering, art, architecture, literature, sports, theater, music, community organizing, politics, agriculture, the building trades, computers--everything must be reworked for sustainability.

And still, on the path to sustainability, I do not think that despair is something to be avoided. Rather, I think the point of despair can become a point of departure for contemplating our deep connections to one another and to nature. When we have made some sense of those connections, then and only then, is it time to move on to action--action now informed by a new and more profound understanding.

Bjorn Lomborg gets confused about global warming

Bjorn Lomborg styles himself as the "skeptical environmentalist." The one thing that he seems most skeptical about is that environmental problems such as global warming are of paramount importance. He recently laid out his thinking in an interview on The News Hour with Jim Lehrer.

Lomborg's main point was that global warming is just one among many problems that we face in the 21st century. Since we can't address all of those problems with equal attention, we should prioritize. So far, so good. But instead of putting global warming near the top of his list, Lomborg places it far below other problems such as the spread of AIDS and malaria, malnutrition, agricultural research and strangely, free trade. (Lomborg, incidently, doesn't see free trade as causing some of the problems we face, but rather as a solution to those problems.)

Now, most doctors know that to cure an illness, one should treat the cause of the disease rather than merely addressing the symptoms. But even though Lomborg acknowledges that global warming will be a leading cause of the problems he seeks to address--problems such as reduced harvests and the spread of disease--he opts for focusing on the symptoms rather than the cause.

His reasoning is that it is far too expensive with current technology to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and that further research may help reduce the costs of doing so. His solution is to invest some money in research and see what happens. He also tosses out the disingenuous red herring that the Kyoto Protocol will do little to affect the trajectory of global warming even if everyone--including those currently opting out such as the United States--meets its targets. In this he is correct. But someone in his position certainly knows that the protocol will be renegotiated in 2012 and that all serious proposals now on the table call for far deeper cuts--as much at 80 percent--in greenhouse gas emissions by mid-century.

Lomborg, who is a political scientist by training and fond of using statistics to make his point, seems to know just enough math to make him dangerous. What he assumes is that the gently sloping temperature curves implied by some models of global warming mean that world society will be able to adapt over time and that this adaptation will be less costly than addressing the problem directly. (Even if these curves are accepted as correct, the idea that it will be cheaper to address symptoms only is strenuously in dispute.) But what Lomborg doesn't seem to know is that natural systems such as climate are not as well-behaved as we'd like to believe. To use the mathemetician's term, such systems are nonlinear.

That means that climate could change abruptly. Even if abrupt climate change is considered a low probability, it would likely be a high-severity event. And, the most severe nonlinear outcome would be runaway global warming which could not be stopped by human action once it begins. Lomborg's proposed priorities simply don't take such possibilities into account. Keep in mind that many scientists who discuss such possibilities believe that if they come to pass, they will severely disrupt and possibly even destroy modern civilization over a period of just a few decades. Lomborg's priorities seem all the more confused given this context.

A third confusion seems almost laughable. Lomborg assumes that even as global warming proceeds, there will be far more wealth in places such as Bangladesh--an impoverished, low-lying country that could suffer greatly from rising oceans and reduced food harvest. Lomborg assumes that other great natural systems such as fisheries and water will not decline greatly even though they are declining precipitously in the present. He also assumes ample energy supplies to power economic growth worldwide over the next century despite the necessity to reduce fossil fuel usage and despite the peaking of oil and natural gas that even the most optimistic experts expect no later than mid-century. It short, he assumes that the disruptions caused by global warming and resource depletion will not greatly affect global economic growth. These are hardly surefire assumptions even if they reflect the wisdom of some unnamed economists at the United Nations which he cites.

Lomborg has organized a group called the Copenhagen Consensus to push his priorities. Perhaps, you may say, the people who participate in the group's various analyses know something we don't about the Earth's natural systems. Alas, no. They are all economists who seem to know little or nothing about natural systems and their dynamics. Beyond this, something seems awry when such economists simultaneously insist that the world economy will experience rapid economic growth in the coming decades, but also act as if we are living in a zero-sum economy that will severely limit resources available to address critical environmental and public health problems.

So what makes Lomborg's ideas so compelling? First, few people would disagree that we need to address AIDS, malaria and malnutrition. And, few people would disagree that we are currently not doing enough about each. In addition, Lomborg is a compelling messenger. He's articulate (in English as well as his native Danish), personable and good-looking.

For all of this Lomborg seems like a captain who, as his ship is being tossed in dangerously unstable seas, focuses on addressing the widespread problem of sea-sickness among the passengers rather than charting a course away from a storm that threatens to capsize his vessel. The reasoning he gives is that the medication for sea-sickness is readily available and cheap, while charting an uncertain detour away from the storm might result in costly delays for the shipping line.

Such logic on its face ought to make us exceedingly skeptical of the skeptical environmentalist and his methods.

Mind meld: Social entrepreneur meets business entrepreneur

It is rarely the intention of an entrepreneur to shake up the social fabric of the society in which he or she works. But, many do anyway. We have only to think of two virtual unknowns starting from scratch in the computer industry, Steven Jobs and Bill Gates, who helped to make the personal computer a ubiquitous tool throughout the world. Add to that the internet, and the power of the individual to obtain, manipulate and transmit information has increased exponentially.

While the advent of the personal computer and the introduction of the internet revolutionized every aspect of life, it did not change the basic trajectory of human civilization, namely, toward ever greater consumption of resources without regard to ecological limits.

Today, many entrepreneurs are thinking about how they can cash in on so-called "green" trends in consumption and lifestyles. Much of this entrepreneurial activity is focused on maintaining our current lifestyles while consuming fewer resources and producing less waste--or at least pretending to do so. But, some entrepreneurs are focused on changing how we live in ways both big and small. One such entrepreneur is Mat (sic) DeGraaf who with his partner runs Door-to-Door Organics. The concept behind Door-To-Door Organics sounds similar to that of CSAs or Community Supported Agriculture. The differences, however, are making it a fast-growing enterprise in the three states--Colorado, Michigan and Pennsylvania--where it currently operates.

Door-To-Door works with a wide variety of local organic farmers and essentially matches what they have to offer through the season with what customers want. Customers must choose a "basket" of goods from several available sizes. But, communicating by internet or phone, they can substitute within that basket by adding more of their favorite items and subtracting what they don't want. The basket is then delivered to the customer's door. Customers also are not obliged to make long-term commitments and can cancel anytime. As a result new customers are more willing to try out the service to see if it works for them.

To be sure Door-To-Door is not a perfect solution for distributing locally grown organic food. But since only a few delivery vehicles are used, the company probably consumes less petroleum than other distribution methods in which each customer picks up his or her food at a dropoff point, a farmers' market or a food co-op .

Is the service a competitor for CSAs? DeGraaf says yes and no. Certainly, the company does provide a service similar to that of CSAs. On the other hand, many CSAs sell their excess produce through Door-To-Door.

Door-To-Door has also been selling at farmers' markets, both as a way to bring produce to market and as a way to attract customers to its service. But at a few markets where organic farmers complained that their sales slumped as a result, the company withdrew. It's simply not part of the mission of the company to undermine organic farmers, DeGraaf explains. In fact, the company is including produce from some farms that are in transition--clearly marked, of course--as a way to insure expanded availability of future local organic supplies. (The transition to organic farming typically takes three years during which the farmer incurs the costs associated with organic methods without being able to charge the premium price usually garnered by organic produce.)

In the off season, the company uses local wholesalers to keep the organic produce coming. Again, it's not a perfect solution; but it keeps the relationships with customers intact while continuing to provide an outlet for organic wholesalers and farmers.

The growth of the organic "industry," as it is now called, has reached 20 percent per year, 10 times the growth in the overall food industry. But much of that growth is premised on the same petroleum-drenched, transportation-intensive infrastructure that the conventional food system depends on.

By contrast, the business model adopted by Door-To-Door has the potential to increase greatly the number of people who source their organic food locally and thereby reduce the energy inputs into their food. But perhaps most important of all, the Door-To-Door business model is both profitable under current conditions and seemingly adaptable to the lower energy, resource-challenged society we are moving toward. And, that combination is the holy grail for businesses that truly want to be part of the transition to a sustainable world.

In the past those who have combined business and social entrepreneurship have often experienced long waits before their ideas caught on or even failed waiting. But the sudden success of Door-To-Door Organics signals that a tipping point may be at hand, both in the caliber of entrepreneurial thinking about sustainability and in the success of companies that have sustainability at the core of their missions.

Is sustainability a drag?

I have been peppered in recent weeks with email asking me how to get people to take peak oil seriously and make the necessary preparations for themselves, their families and their communities. The emphasis has been on what to tell them. But I think the emphasis should be on what to show them.

The way most people talk about sustainability, it sounds like a drag. After all, people are called upon to give up their cars and ride the bus, to stop watching the stupid television, and to go to more places by walking and bicycling (and that means going uphill at least part of the time!). It means avoiding packaged food, eating less meat, and eating more fruits and vegetables, local and organic if you can find it. It means traveling less, at least by plane or car. It means giving up the consumer life of endless new gadgets and clothes that so many have become used to. It means remembering to shut off the lights and turn down the heat. And, it means (gasp!) no air conditioning in the summer. In short, it sounds like a regimen of self-abnegation that is likely to entice only those wanting to become monks.

I do not think that people should stop talking about sustainability. We need all the dialogue we can get about what works and what doesn't and about why moving closer to a sustainable life is not only worth it, but can have many advantages over the current terminal, power dive that we call global industrial capitalism. But to restate an old and well-worn phrase: A picture is worth a thousand words.

Only when others see with their own eyes that those seeking sustainability are having enjoyable lives will the switch seem worth making. Just one shot of genuine cheerfulness, humor and even exuberance goes much further than a year's worth of pious sermons. Again, it doesn't mean that people should not talk about sustainability. They should talk about it and focus on making it happen in their own lives--not in order to be a good example for others, but rather because it is a good thing in itself for each individual. After all, if moving toward sustainability is miserable (and I don't think it is), who's going to want to do it?

Moving toward sustainability is a daunting task. And, it seems as if the best any of us can do is simply to become less unsustainable. But, we must start somewhere. Some people may even admire our less unsustainable lifestyle, but say that they could never live that way. I think that's because they believe such changes have been made all at once. Certainly, some people achieve sudden, thoroughgoing changes in their lives. But most of us who are trying to live more sustainably add saner, more sustainable practices gradually over time as we become more comfortable with the steps we've already taken and as we understand more deeply what is truly sustainable.

What's the first move? For Americans it could easily be this. If you have three cars, try going down to two. If you have two cars, try going down to one. For those who understand the stakes, this doesn't seem like much. But the first move begins a process that focuses the mind on the next step even as the first one proceeds. This step-by-step approach--which is the one I've followed--makes it possible to adapt to each change and then move on to the next change. Success breeds success.

Some may complain that time grows too short for a gradualist approach. I fear that this may be true. But I am trying to work with human beings as they are. They don't like change. If they must change, they prefer it in digestible increments. But, each success increases a person's confidence that next change will work.

The key is to reach a tipping point where millions and then billions are moving in the right direction. It starts with you, and then your neighbor and then your friends who live nearby. It may seem like we'll never make it in time to head off serious problems. But if we're lucky, we'll reach the tipping point and the move toward sustainability all around our cities, our countries and even the world will gain unstoppable momentum. Can we afford not to try?

A peak by any other name is still a peak

Those who criticize peak oil theory or at least the conclusion that peak oil is nearby find themselves faced with a naming problem. If they believe that oil supplies are for all practical purposes infinite (an idea usually associated with the abiotic theory of oil), they are consigned to the category of people who are incapable of accepting the overwhelming evidence that no matter what oil's origins, it is, in any time frame that matters to humans, finite. They are not exactly cornucopians. Genuine cornucopians don't deny that hydrocarbons are limited in supply. Rather, they believe that humans will find ingenious new ways to power their economies through innovation and marketplace incentives and that they will do this in plenty of time. At the very least, the infinite supply theorists should not be classed among the reality-based community.

Of those who accept that oil is a finite resource, many believe a decline in supply won't occur for three decades or more. They use such words as "undulating plateau" or "no visible peak" (Michael Lynch) to describe their views. Perhaps the most ingenious formulation is that put forth by Daniel Yergin, long-time head of Cambridge Energy Research Associates, that the risks to oil supply lie above ground rather than below it. This implies a desire for a certain kind of unspecified foreign and domestic policy to solve the "above ground" problems. (These problems, of course, are problems primarily for oil importers, not oil exporters.) The problems include the following:

1. The most promising areas for oil exploration are under the control of national oil companies that refuse to open them to large-scale prospecting and development by foreign-based firms.


2. The chaos in oil-rich areas such as Nigeria and Iraq is preventing oil production from reaching its full capacity.


3. Unreasonable restrictions on drilling in such areas as the water surrounding the United States and public lands owned by the government are delaying much needed discoveries.


4. Industry is not investing enough in exploration, infrastructure and alternative energy.

Just how much violence, war or state coercion Yergin might be willing to accept to solve these problems is unclear, especially since Yergin styles himself as a free market advocate. But he may not qualify for inclusion in the reality-based community if he believes that rational problem-solving will somehow allow us to overcome all of the hurdles he enumerates.

The point is that Yergin is actually expanding the case for his opponents in the peak oil debate. Peak oil isn't just a product of geology. It will be the result of the interaction of geological reality, infrastructure, political and military decisions, economic cycles, and consumer behavior. Peak is about flows, and flows of oil may end up peaking for any number of reasons even if the underlying resource remains quite large. Yes, geology is not the only consideration. But, is a peak any less of a peak if it occurs for a multitude of reasons rather than one? Won't we will still have to deal with the resulting fallout?

From a larger perspective, the debate over the exact timing of peak oil really comes down to this: How much running room do we have before we go off a cliff? Given the damage that a cliff implies and given the uncertainty over how much running room we have, wouldn't it be wise to make serious efforts to prepare now instead of waiting to see just how close to the cliff we really are?

Mexico and the first peak oil mass migration

More than 30 years ago French writer Jean Raspail warned in his anti-immigration novel The Camp of the Saints of a coming deluge of the world's poor onto European soil. His ghoulish vision of an immigrant invasion frightened some and angered many others who called it racist when the book appeared in 1973.

Today, climate scientists are warning of mass migrations related to the effects of global warming. In addition, the possibility of the first peak oil driven mass migration--in this case out of Mexico and into the United States--is starting to get some attention as well.

More than a third of Mexico's government revenues comes from the state petroleum monopoly, Petróleos Mexicanos, often referred to as PEMEX. Fast declining output from the company's giant Cantarell field is frustrating efforts to maintain overall production. Some believe that Mexico may now have passed peak oil. If this is so, it is difficult to see how Mexico will be able to maintain its current level of public services or continue on a path of unevenly distributed, but moderately rising prosperity.

Meanwhile, on the U. S. side of the border, conspiracy theories abound about a contract given to Halliburton last year to build, if called upon, emergency temporary immigration detention facilities for the U. S. Department of Homeland Security. One acquaintance of mine informed me the facilities will actually be used to detain American dissidents during a period of martial law. The more likely explanation is that homeland security officials have been reading the reports in the media (and perhaps their own internal ones) about Mexico's oil future and want to be ready for any sudden surge in Mexican immigration. Without mentioning Mexico specifically, a spokesperson for Immigration and Customs Enforcement which is part of the Homeland Security Department told The New York Times last year, "It's the type of contract that could be used in some kind of mass migration."

Not surprisingly, sudden mass migrations due to ecological catastrophe or resource depletion remain largely an abstraction, even in the minds of those who are aware of such possibilities. But the ongoing slow-motion mass migration across the southern border of the United States has once again begun to stoke the anti-immigrant forces who like Raspail 30 years ago are putting a face--and not a flattering one--on that migration. The Republicans already have one avowed anti-immigrant presidential candidate, Rep. Tom Tancredo, who has made immigration his central issue. I predict that he will do far better than anyone now expects even if an oil depletion induced migration does not occur before the primaries.

As long as the real reason behind such a migration remains obscure, the domestic discussion in the United States will be about jobs and the "threat" to American culture. The issue of immigration and border security is already a thorny one, but it will likely become even more confused as oil depletion proceeds in Mexico. All of this may develop against the backdrop of a plateau or even decline in worldwide production, something that could spark a global recession and further exacerbate concern over the perceived threat of job competition from immigrants as their numbers and their desperation rise.

It is an unhappy development that even as the need for concerted public action increases on such issues as global warming and peak oil, the American appetite for collective action is waning. The general feeling across the land is that public action somehow disproportionately benefits those who are different from America's largely white middle-class tax base, according to Peter Schrag writing in The Nation recently (subscription required).

But, the problems of global warming and oil depletion go beyond borders and will require Americans to do things collectively with other countries whose people aren't like them. And, most assuredly, the problems associated with the world's first peak oil migration aren't going to be solved if Americans bury their heads in the sand and pretend that it's somebody else's problem, one completely unconnected to our own fate.

But what might cooperation with Mexico look like? If it's intelligent cooperation, it would include conservation measures on both sides of the border and perhaps joint development of wind and solar power. It will be in our interest to help Mexico because the better things are there, the more likely it will be that Mexico's citizens will prosper in their own country rather than seek livelihoods in the United States.

But joint action such as this won't even be remotely possible if those who take their inspiration from Jean Raspail or from America's own Tom Tancredo come to dominate the immigration debate in the United States.